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Federal Constitutions, Global Governance, and the Role of
Forests in Regulating Climate Change†
BLAKE HUDSON
Federal systems of government present more difficulties for international treaty
formation than perhaps any other form of governance. Federal constitutions that
grant subnational governments virtually exclusive regulatory authority over certain
subject matter may constrain national governments during international
negotiations—a national government that cannot constitutionally bind subnational
governments to an international agreement cannot freely arrange its international
obligations. While federal nations that grant subnational governments exclusive
regulatory control obviously place value on stringent decentralization and the
benefits it provides in those regulatory areas, the difficulty lies in striking a
balance between global governance and constitutional decentralization in federal
systems. Recent scholarship demonstrates that U.S. federalism, for example, may
jeopardize international negotiations seeking to utilize certain mechanisms of
global forest management to combat climate change, since subnational forest
management is a regulatory responsibility reserved for state governments under
current constitutional jurisprudence. This Article expands that scholarship by
undertaking a comparative constitutional analysis of five other federal systems—
Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, and Russia. These nations, along with the United
States, are crucial to climate and forest negotiations since they account for 54% of
the world’s total forest cover. This Article reviews the constitutional allocation of
forest regulatory authority between national and subnational governments in these
nations to better understand potential complications that federal systems present
for global climate governance aimed at forests. The Article concludes that federal
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systems maintaining three key elements within their constitutional structure are
most capable of agreeing to an international climate agreement that incorporates
forests in a consequential manner—elements that facilitate successful
implementation of a treaty on domestic scales while maintaining the recognized
benefits of decentralized forest management at the local level: (1) national
constitutional primacy over forest management, (2) national sharing of
constitutional forest management authority, and (3) adequate forest policy
institutional enforcement capacity. The Article also establishes the foundation for
further research assessing how the constitutional status quo of federal systems
lacking key elements may be adjusted to achieve more effective climate and forest
governance.
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 1456
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INTRODUCTION
Nations concerned about the difficulty of accommodating particular
obligations within their constitutional schemes . . . may decline
altogether to enter into a treaty that poses a serious risk of conflict with
their constitutions. At the domestic level, well-grounded constitutional
principles may be insurmountable . . . .1
Federalism and a spirited foreign policy go ill together. 2
Recently, at the United Nations Global Conference on Environmental
Governance and Democracy,3 numerous scholars expressed concern over political

1. Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 403, 461 62 (2003).
2. K.C. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 196 (1953).
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disconnects among countries engaged in international negotiations on climate
change, which is perhaps the most complex and challenging environmental issue of
our time. Much of the conference discussion focused on strengthening institutions
at various levels of governance to forge political will for action on climate change,
either through the creation of new legislation facilitating climate change mitigation
and adaptation or through improved enforcement of existing climate change laws. 4
Political will to create and enforce effective regulatory mechanisms on international
and domestic scales is undoubtedly critical to effective global environmental
governance, especially in an area as contentious as climate change. Another
question, however, necessarily precedes an inquiry into political will—that is, does
an adequate legal institutional framework exist within participant countries to
ensure that in the presence of political will, if and when it occurs, international
treaties can be successfully negotiated and implemented domestically? Without
adequate legal institutions to effectively translate global politics into domestic
policy, the most robust of international treaties will not be effectively implemented
on domestic scales.
Indeed, recent scholarship on international climate negotiations demonstrates
how domestic governance limitations—specifically principles of federalism
embedded in a country’s constitution—may complicate the implementation of a
non-self-executing, legally binding climate change treaty that addresses global
forest management via certain regulatory mechanisms, or perhaps even prohibit
treaty formation altogether.5 In most nation-states, written constitutions are the
ultimate source from which legal institutional strength flows.6 Countries with

3. An earlier draft of this Article was accepted for presentation at the conference—held
at Yale University on September 17–19, 2010, and sponsored by the United Nations Institute
for Training and Research. Blake Hudson, Implications of Constitutional Forest Governance
Disparities Among Federal States for International Climate Negotiations, UNITAR,
http://conference.unitar.org/yale/democratic-institutions-and-environmental-sustainability.
4. Conference
papers
are
available
online.
UNITAR,
http://conference.unitar.org/yale/conference-papers.
5. See Blake Hudson & Erika Weinthal, Seeing the Global Forest for the Trees: How
U.S. Federalism Can Coexist with Global Governance of Forests, 1 J. NAT. RESOURCES
POL’Y RES. 353 (2009) [hereinafter Hudson I]; Blake Hudson, Climate Change, Forests, and
Federalism: Seeing the Treaty for the Trees, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 363 (2011) [hereinafter
Hudson II]. This scholarship has focused on the debate among American constitutional law
scholars regarding the scope of the U.S. federal government’s treaty power, the history of the
United States invoking federalism in order to inhibit treaty formation and participation, and
the constitutional and judicial deference afforded to state and local governments—even in
the presence of an international treaty—in the area of private property land-use regulation,
including forest management regulations. Due to the great uncertainty surrounding the
question of whether federalism limits the U.S. federal government’s ability to enter into and
implement a legally binding treaty that would require direct regulation of forest management
activities via prescriptive mechanisms, this scholarship suggested that as long as the current
constitutional status quo remains, future treaties aimed at forest management should rely on
voluntary, market-based mechanisms to facilitate U.S. participation and avoid domestic
judicial challenges to treaty implementation by subnational units of government and private
property owners in the United States.
6. See generally Martin Edelman, Written Constitutions, Democracy and Judicial
Interpretation: The Hobgoblin of Judicial Activism, 68 ALB. L. REV. 585 (2005); see also
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federal systems of government, like the United States, pose particularly acute
challenges to a variety of international negotiations 7 because federal systems are
constitutionally decentralized8 and regulatory authority over treaty subject matter
may be divided between the national and subnational units of government. Thus,
national governments in federal systems may be constrained in treaty negotiations
by subnational governments that challenge domestic treaty implementation as
outside the scope of the national government’s constitutional authority.
Take, for example, the role of the United States in climate change negotiations
related to global forest management. The international community is increasingly
focused on carbon sequestration via improved forest management as perhaps the
most effective tool in battling climate change, 9 and “realization of the significance
of climate change impacts of greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and
forest degradation has brought renewed impetus to efforts to conserve and better
manage forests globally.”10 The global benefits of responsible local forest
management are enormous, as approximately 20% of annual global carbon
emissions result from forest loss and degradation.11 This is more carbon than is
emitted by the transportation sector each year. 12 Indeed, sustainable forest
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, An Overview of Court Review for Constitutionality in the United
States, 57 LA. L. REV. 1019, 1025 (1997).
7. Such negotiations include those related to human rights, criminal law and
punishment, commerce and trade, and the environment. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power
and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 402 08 (1998).
8. Scholars have stated that,
federations use the principle of constitutional non-centralization rather than
decentralization.
. . . In other words, when independent states decide to create a federation and a
federal system of government, they confer, generally through a constitution,
certain specific responsibilities and authorities to the federal government in the
interest of all states. . . . [F]or these reasons, use of the term decentralized is
somewhat awkward in the case of federal governments.
Hans M. Gregersen, Arnoldo Contreras-Hermosilla, Andy White & Lauren Phillips, Forest
Governance in Federal Systems: An Overview of Experiences and Implications for
Decentralization, in THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, POWER AND PEOPLE 13,
14–15 (Carol J. Pierce Colfer & Doris Capistrano eds., 2005) (emphasis in original).
9. See infra notes 34 35 and accompanying text.
10. CONSTANCE L. MCDERMOTT, BENJAMIN CASHORE & PETER KANOWSKI, GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL FOREST POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 4 (2010).
11. Id. at 6.
12. See ERIN C. MYERS, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, POLICIES TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM
DEFORESTATION AND DEGRADATION (REDD) IN TROPICAL FORESTS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
ISSUES FACING THE INCORPORATION OF REDD INTO MARKET-BASED CLIMATE POLICIES 4
(2007), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-07-50.pdf. For further
information on the process of carbon sequestration, see Kenneth L. Denman & Guy
Brasseur, Couplings Between Changes in the Climate System and Biogeochemistry, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I
TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE
500
(Susan
Solomon
et
al.
eds.,
2007),
available
at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-chapter7.pdf. In 2007, U.S.
forests sequestered approximately 8% of total U.S. carbon emissions. ERIC M. WHITE &
RALPH J. ALIG, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FOREST OWNERSHIP IN THE CONTEXT OF CARBON
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management provides a variety of benefits along a spectrum from local to global
scales. Local communities that effectively manage forest resources gain economic
and environmental goods and services in the form of timber and food production,
clean water, clean air, and biodiversity. In turn, the global community gains
sequestration of carbon, as governments seek to battle the effects of climate change
by including forest carbon in the ever-growing carbon credit market. 13 Ultimately,
global benefits derived from forests cannot materialize without the aggregation of
responsible national and subnational forest management, demonstrating the
inextricability of localized resource management decisions from global concerns
and impacts.14
Though participation of the United States is an important component to
achieving these global benefits, the United States’s role in capitalizing on forest
management to address climate change is complicated by its federalist form of
governance. U.S. regulatory authority over forest management is constitutionally
divided between the federal and state governments, with state governments
responsible for regulating the nearly 65% of “local” U.S. forests that are in either
state ownership (approximately 5%) or private ownership (approximately 60%). 15
Thus, even if the national government wished to obligate the United States to
certain types of forest management requirements within an international climate
treaty, it may arguably only do so on the 35% of nationally owned forests subject to
its constitutional control. Consequently, the national government would be unable
to effectively implement the treaty on nearly two-thirds of the United States’s
forested lands, as any congressional implementing legislation would likely be
challenged by state governments and private property owners as beyond Congress’s
powers and as intruding upon a regulatory role constitutionally reserved to state
governments. Thus, the United States would be in violation of its international
obligations. By contrast, nonfederal nation-states with centralized, or “unitary,”
forms of government may act without legal constraint during international climate
negotiations—the lack of exclusive areas of subnational constitutional authority in
SEQUESTRATION AND BIOENERGY FEEDSTOCK PRODUCTION—A BRIEFING PAPER ON EXISTING
RESEARCH
AND
RESEARCH
NEEDS
9
(2010),
available
at
http://www.fsl.orst.edu/lulcd/Publicationsalpha_files/White_Public_Private_Briefing.pdf.
13. Manish Bapna, Forests, Climate Change and the Challenge of REDD, WORLD
RESOURCES INST., http://www.wri.org/stories/2010/03/forests-climate-change-and-challengeredd; see also MYERS, supra note 12, at 4.
14. It has been noted that,
[f]orests are profoundly local. . . .
At the same time, forests are truly global. . . .
....
The challenge is to find a governance framework that can balance the various
local, national and global interests related to forests. Everyone agrees that local
groups should be allowed to come up with solutions that reflect their own needs
and circumstances; but regional, national and global concerns must also be
addressed.
Wahjudi Wardojo, Foreword to THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, POWER AND
PEOPLE, supra note 8, at ix, ix.
15. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 3: PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 110 (2002), available at http://www.unep.org/geo/GEO3/
english/pdf.htm (follow “Forests” hyperlink).
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these countries allows central governments to more freely obligate their respective
nations to the dictates of a legally binding treaty. 16
Despite being overlooked by climate change scholars, federal constitutional
limitations have potentially significant implications for global climate change or
other negotiations related to forests. Though federal systems of government
comprise only approximately 13% of the world’s governments, they maintain
control over 70 to 80% of the world’s forests. 17 As a result, the domestic
constitutional governance structures of federal systems controlling important forest
resources should be assessed to better understand potential complications that may
arise during international climate negotiations related to forests. As the threat of
climate change becomes more apparent and the resulting law and policy responses
adjust over time, it will be crucial that world governments maintain, and are able to
effectively utilize, every legal and policy tool at their disposal. A collaborative
international response to climate change can certainly take many forms, ranging
from individualized action by single nations, to transnational forms, 18 to a legally
binding global treaty. The utilization of a binding treaty, however, may be
diminished if constitutionally decentralized federal systems controlling important
forest resources are unable to fully participate.
In addition to the United States, five federal systems in particular—Australia,
Brazil, Canada, India, and Russia—account for 54% of the world’s total forest
cover,19 and are thus vitally important to climate negotiations. Though a handful of

16. “Unitary” systems of government “may have sub-national levels of governments;
but these are not constitutionally empowered to make decisions on major government
services and functions; rather, they are subordinate units.” Gregersen et al., supra note 8, at
15. These subordinate units are intended to “balance the burden of governance.” Ian
Ferguson & Cherukat Chandrasekharan, Paths and Pitfalls of Decentralization for
Sustainable Forest Management: Experiences of the Asia Pacific Region, in THE POLITICS OF
DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, POWER AND PEOPLE, supra note 8, at 63, 65. To be clear,
national governments in unitary systems may certainly be politically thwarted by subnational
government or interest group influence, but unitary governments maintain the legal authority
to act if and when they politically choose to do so. In federal systems, on the other hand,
even in the presence of national political will, any one subnational actor may challenge a
national act as unconstitutional and may succeed in having it invalidated.
17. ARNOLDO CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA, HANS M. GREGERSEN & ANDY WHITE, CTR.
FOR INT’L FORESTRY RES., FOREST GOVERNANCE IN COUNTRIES WITH FEDERAL SYSTEMS OF
GOVERNMENT: LESSONS FOR DECENTRALIZATION 1 (2008), available at
http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_files/GovBrief/GovBrief0739E.pdf. There are
approximately 167 unitary systems of government, while there are only 26 federal systems
of
government.
Federalism
by
Country,
F.
OF
FEDERATIONS,
http://www.forumfed.org/en/federalism/by_country/index.php.
18. These may include voluntary or other arrangements between groups of nations or
nongovernmental organizations.
19. Of the world’s approximately 4 billion hectares of forest, Australia maintains 165
million hectares; Brazil, 493 million hectares; Canada, 310 million hectares; Russia, 809
million hectares; and the United States, 302 million hectares. JACEK P. SIRY, FREDERICK W.
CUBBAGE, & DAVID H. NEWMAN, XIII WORLD FORESTRY CONG., GLOBAL FOREST
OWNERSHIP: IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREST PRODUCTION, MANAGEMENT, AND PROTECTION 3
(2009), available at http://www.pefc.org/images/stories/documents/external/global_forest
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scholars have provided descriptive, comparative analyses of the effects of resource
management decentralization in federal nation-states,20 scholars have failed to
adequately assess the potential limiting effects of federal nation-state domestic
constitutional constraints on international climate negotiations. Regardless of past
and present political impacts on climate treaty formation, such as insufficient
domestic political will or political disagreements between the developed and
developing world,21 such an assessment is clearly warranted to determine whether a
sufficient legal institutional framework exists in federal systems to facilitate the full
range of market-based and regulatory options within international agreements that
incorporate forests. If the constitutional framework in a federal system limits the
national government’s authority to effectively implement a treaty on a subject
matter reserved to subnational governments, a more important question will be how
to craft constitutional approaches in these systems that best facilitate international
agreement.
An equally important question is how to balance global climate and forest
governance with the benefits that decentralized forest management provides on
local scales. Though certain federal systems, like the United States, present
challenges for national and international policy up the ladder of forest resource
governance, those same systems may more readily facilitate benefits on local scales
down the ladder. Indeed, constitutionally decentralized federal systems provide a
variety of governance benefits for local resource managers. 22 Balancing the
provision of global forest goods and services (such as climate change mitigation)
via the implementation of international agreements with the provision of national
and local goods via sustainable decentralized forest policy is a particularly
challenging task within federal systems.
This Article uses the lens of climate change, and the role of forest management
in facilitating climate change solutions, to explore the realities of balancing
domestic constitutional federalism with both global environmental governance and
sustainable national and local forest management. The Article does so by assessing
how the division of regulatory authority over forests between national and
subnational governments in the above federal systems may affect global climate
negotiations. More specifically, the Article analyzes whether—and to what
degree—these federal countries maintain adequate constitutional capacity to enter
into a viable climate treaty including forest management, to successfully implement
such a treaty domestically, and to do so in a way most conducive to capturing the
benefits of decentralized forest policy. Included in this assessment is a review of
the split in public and private ownership of forests, which is of critical importance
because different levels of government in federal systems maintain constitutional
_ownership_FD.pdf. India maintains seventy-seven million hectares. INDIAN INST. OF FOREST
MGMT., NATIONAL FOREST
POLICY REVIEW: INDIA
111,
available
at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/AC921E/AC921E04.pdf.
20. See generally CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA ET AL., supra note 17; HANS GREGERSEN,
ARNOLDO CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA, ANDY WHITE, & LAUREN PHILLIPS, CTR. FOR INT’L
FORESTRY RES., FOREST GOVERNANCE IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS: AN OVERVIEW OF EXPERIENCES
AND
IMPLICATIONS
FOR
DECENTRALIZATION
(2004),
available
at
http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_files/interlaken/Interlaken_pre-paper.pdf; THE
POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, POWER AND PEOPLE, supra note 8.
21. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
22. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
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regulatory authority over forests depending on whether the forests are publicly or
privately owned. The split in national/subnational authority and public/private
forest ownership can be represented as two axes of disparity among federal systems
in the area of forest management, with different federal systems falling into
different quadrants. Figure 1 below provides a visualization of the widely divergent
positions from which federal nation-states approach international climate
negotiations aimed at forests.

Where a federal system falls along these axes affects its legal domestic treaty
implementation capabilities, as well as the political will it maintains to negotiate a
treaty in the first instance. As explained below, the U.S. and Canadian national
governments have extremely limited control over direct forest management
activities on both state/provincial forestlands and private forestlands because
“constitutional primacy” over decentralized forest policy remains with the
subnational states or provinces. While these systems obviously place value on
constitutionally decentralized forest governance, their chosen constitutional
structure makes it very difficult to bind subnational governments to specific forest
management directives via international treaty. By contrast, the Brazilian and
Russian national governments maintain far more authority over forest resources
relative to subnational governments, thus giving those countries what may be
termed “national constitutional primacy” over decentralized forest policy.
Furthermore, 75% of Brazil’s forests, 60% of the United States’s forests, and 26%
of Australia’s forests are privately owned, whereas 93% of forests are publicly
owned in Canada, 92% in Russia, and 97% in India23—further complicating global
forest governance negotiations among federal systems. Ultimately, because

23. See infra text accompanying notes 165, 199, 222, 240, and 267.
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different levels of government, with different levels of constitutional authority, may
directly regulate different categories of forest ownership, federalism and propertyrights complications have the potential to adversely impact future climate
negotiations among federal systems. This Article aims to identify potential
federalism-based legal impediments to future climate negotiations by analyzing the
constitutional structures of these federal nation-states—a key step toward assessing
how to craft constitutional approaches in federal systems that best facilitate both
international agreement on climate and effective domestic forest policy.
The Article proceeds in four parts. First, in order to explain the foundational
research upon which this Article builds and establish the context for subsequent
comparative analysis, Part I summarizes prior research on domestic constitutional
constraints on international climate negotiations arising out of the U.S.
constitutional structure. Part II introduces and analyzes three key elements of
federal constitutional structure that most readily facilitate the formation of an
international climate agreement aimed at forest management activities, its
successful implementation at the domestic level, and preservation of the benefits of
decentralized forest policy. In other words, the presence of all three elements
allows federal systems to strike a difficult balance given the realities of federalism,
international negotiations on forests, and the need to sustainably manage forest
resources across scales. These elements are: (1) national government constitutional
primacy over national and subnational forest policy, (2) national government
sharing of its constitutional authority over forest policy with subnational units of
government, and (3) forest policy institutional enforcement capacity. 24
Part III next surveys and provides a comparative analysis of the constitutional
division of forest regulatory authority between national and subnational
governments and the allocation of forest ownership in Australia, Brazil, Canada,
India, and Russia (with comparative reference to the United States)—thus
describing which key elements discussed in Part II are currently retained by these
systems.25 Part IV summarizes the findings presented in Part III, explaining that
each federal system analyzed maintains some combination of these three elements
and that those with all three provide the constitutional framework most conducive
to negotiating and successfully implementing an international climate treaty aimed
at forests, while also capturing the benefits of decentralized federal forest policy.
Part IV also situates these federal systems within a recently articulated policy

24. Elements one and three are legal in nature, arising out of a federal system’s
constitutional order. Systems maintaining these two elements are most capable of entering
into and successfully implementing an international agreement. The second element is
political in nature, and federal systems maintaining this element most readily facilitate the
well-recognized benefits of decentralized forest policy—which unsurprisingly track the
recognized benefits of having a federal system of government in the first place.
25. It was not within the scope of this Article to assess every federal system controlling
important forest resources. These five countries, however, along with the United States,
account for 54% of the world’s total forest cover. SIRY ET AL., supra note 19 and
accompanying text. Nonetheless, the findings, conclusions, and implications of the research
presented in this Article are equally applicable to other federal systems, and it is my hope
that scholars will undertake full assessment of other federal systems controlling forest
resources.
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formulation and implementation matrix, which provides a framework for analyzing
the consequences of federal systems lacking key elements, with both domestic and
international implications. This Article concludes by suggesting further research
aimed at assessing solutions to the absence of key elements in certain federal
systems.
I. IMPACTS OF U.S. FEDERALISM ON INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AND FOREST
NEGOTIATIONS
Though the international community has increasingly focused on global
standardization of forest management practices, particularly regarding the role of
forests in combating climate change, efforts over the past two decades to achieve
harmonization of national and local forest practices within a legally binding
international treaty have failed.26 This failure is in part due to political disconnects

26. Since the late 1980s, countries supporting global governance of forests have made
numerous attempts to negotiate a legally binding international forest treaty, though each has
failed. Various international fora have facilitated these negotiations: the 1992 U.N.
Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro; four sessions
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF) between 1995 and 1997; four rounds of the
Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) between 1997 and 2000; and most recently,
numerous sessions of the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) in the 2000s. Radoslav
S. Dimitrov, Detlef F. Sprinz, Gerald M. DiGiusto & Alexander Kelle, International
Nonregimes: A Research Agenda, 9 INT’L STUD. REV. 230, 243 (2007); accord Deborah S.
Davenport & Peter Wood, Finding the Way Forward for the International Arrangement on
Forests: UNFF-5, -6 and -7, 15 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 316, 316 (2006);
S. Guéneau & P. Tozzi, Towards the Privatization of Global Forest Governance?, 10 INT’L
FORESTRY REV. 550, 552 (2008). The timeline for post-1992 forest negotiations has been
described as follows:
International forest policy negotiations have often been characterized by
political entrenchment . . . .
. . . Since the failure at the 1992 [UNCED] in Rio de Janeiro to achieve a
legally binding forest convention, several fora have been developed in order to
allow international forest policy discussions to continue . . . .
....
. . . [But a] convention speciﬁcally addressing forests eluded consensus. . . .
[T]he [IPF] was established as an expert body under the UN Commission on
Sustainable Development (CSD), with a 2-year work programme intended to
combat deforestation and forest degradation. The IPF . . . led to the creation of
the [IFF] in 1997 . . . . The UNFF was then formed, with a plan of action that
centered on implementation of the IPF/IFF proposals for action. . . . [T]he
creation of the UNFF had less to do with monitoring the implementation of the
proposals for action than it had to do with compromise: the need to counter the
disappointment of some at the lack of an agreement to negotiate a forest
convention with the creation of a new, more permanent forum with a
substantially higher level of political authority.
Davenport & Wood, supra, at 316 17. The 2007 UNFF talks did result in a “Non-legally
Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on Management,
Conservation, and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests,” which sought to
promote sustainable forest management worldwide and international cooperation on global
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between the developed and developing worlds, with the developing world
expressing skepticism over attempted developed country efforts to curb the
destruction of tropical rainforest.27 However, scholars have specifically cited the
United States’s unwillingness to unequivocally support an international agreement
as the primary factor driving the failure of global climate and forest negotiations. 28
U.S. intransigence is especially significant because the United States is widely
considered to be the most influential country in global environmental governance
negotiations, and thus U.S. participation is crucial to the success of any global
environmental treaty.29
U.S. leadership is especially crucial in the case of climate change negotiations
directed at global forest management. The United States is one of the greatest
emitters of atmospheric carbon in the world, maintaining the second highest total
and per capita carbon emissions as of 2008.30 The United States also maintains the
fourth-largest forest estate of any country on the globe, as 8% of the world’s forests
are in the United States.31 Scholars have argued that, “most observers believe that a
key element for a successful set of [climate] negotiations . . . is the adoption by the
United States of a set of binding limits for U.S. greenhouse gas emissions . . . .” 32
Yet the United States has failed to set such limits. In fact, despite the key role the
United States plays in global environmental governance generally, it participates in
only one-third of existing international environmental agreements, failing to either
sign or ratify many significant treaties. Importantly, the United States has refused
to ratify the current guiding climate change treaty, the Kyoto Protocol.33
forest issues. G.A. Res. 62/98, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/98 (Jan. 31, 2008), available at
http://www.fao.org/forestry/14717-03d86aa8c1a7426cf69bf9e2f5023bb12.pdf.
Some
scholars, however, claim that the instrument “looks unlikely to achieve any real
consolidation of global forest governance.” Guéneau & Tozzi , supra, at 552.
27. The developing world has viewed a global forest treaty as a means for the developed
world to raise trade barriers and to engage in “forest colonialism” by obligating the
developing world to take economically detrimental action to protect tropical forests while
refusing to enforce the same regulations on temperate and boreal forests. See Radoslav S.
Dimitrov, Knowledge, Power, and Interests in Environmental Regime Formation, 47 INT’L
STUD. Q. 123, 135 (2003).
28. See Deborah S. Davenport, An Alternative Explanation for the Failure of the
UNCED Forest Negotiations, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., Feb. 2005, at 105; see also Radoslav S.
Dimitrov, Hostage to Norms: States, Institutions and Global Forest Politics, GLOBAL ENVTL.
POL., Nov. 2005, at 1.
29. See Davenport, supra note 28; Dimitrov, supra note 27.
30. Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science/each-countrys-shareof-co2.html.
31. Gerald A. Rose, Douglas W. MacCleery, Ted L. Lorensen, Gary Lettman, David C.
Zumeta, Mike Carroll, Timothy C. Boyce & Bruce Springer, Forest Resources
Decision-Making in the US, in THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, POWER AND
PEOPLE, supra note 8, at 238, 238.
32. Christophe A.G. Tulou, Michael L. Goo, Patrick A. Parenteau & John Costenbader,
Climate Change and the Marine Environment, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY
571, 586 (Donald C. Baur, Tim Eichenberg & Michael Sutton eds., 2008).
33. See Katrina L. Fischer, Harnessing the Treaty Power in Support of Environmental
Regulation of Activities that Don’t “Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce”: Recognizing
the Realities of the New Federalism, 22 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 167, 199 (2004). The Kyoto
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Despite the failure of the United States to take a leading role in past climate and
forest talks, the international community—including the UNFF and the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—continues to
move toward harnessing global forest management as a means of combating
climate change, primarily through the inclusion of market-based incentives to
achieve “Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation”
(REDD).34 Despite high hopes, a post-Kyoto climate agreement failed to
materialize during Climate Change Conference number fifteen (COP-15) in
Copenhagen at the end of 2009. While there is increasing inertia toward direct
inclusion of forest management within any future climate agreement that may
arise,35 the politics of global climate change negotiations continue to be contentious
within the United States. This contentiousness is perhaps best evidenced by the
United States’s persistent failure to pass domestic climate change legislation.36
With the 2010 midterm congressional elections resulting in the largest power-shift
in the House of Representatives since 1948—ushering in representatives opposed
to climate cap and trade—the politics of regulatory action on climate change is
unlikely to improve in the near term. 37
Protocol (adopted in 1997 and entering into force in 2005), is a multilateral environmental
agreement that assigned binding carbon reduction targets and timeframes to “Annex I,” or
industrialized nations, as well as general commitments for all signatory nations. K. Levin, C.
McDermott & B. Cashore, The Climate Regime as Global Forest Governance: Can Reduced
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) Initiatives Pass a ‘Dual
Effectiveness’ Test?, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 538, 543–44 (2008). The United States signed
the Kyoto Protocol but the U.S. Congress never ratified it. Fischer, supra, at 199.
34. The UNFF, which concluded its 8th session in May 2009, is the primary forum for
what may be termed “stand-alone” forest negotiations. Though these negotiations are outside
the context of direct climate negotiations, they seek to develop a role for forests in
combating climate change, promote sustainable forestry, and preserve forest ecosystem
services. Additionally, the UNFCCC is increasingly discussing methods of addressing global
forest management via a post-Kyoto climate treaty. See A. Angelsen, REDD Models and
Baselines, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 465 (2008); T. Johns, F. Merry, C. Stickler, D. Nepstad,
N. LaPorte & S. Goetz, A Three-Fund Approach to Incorporating Government, Public and
Private Forest Stewards into a REDD Funding Mechanism, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 458
(2008); A. Karsenty, S. Guéneau, D. Capistrano, B. Singer & J-L. Peyron, Summary of the
Proceedings of the International Workshop “The International Regime, Avoided
Deforestation and the Evolution of Public and Private Policies Towards Forests in
Developing Countries” Held in Paris, 21-23rd November 2007, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV.
424 (2008); Levin et al., supra note 33.
35. See Levin et al., supra note 33, at 539.
36. See American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2010) (Kerry-Lieberman Bill);
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009)
(Waxman-Markey Bill); Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th
Cong. (2007); Dingell-Boucher Cap-and-Trade Bill, INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY RESEARCH,
http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2008/10/07/dingell-boucher-cap-and-trade-bill/.
37. See Quinn Bowman & Chris Amico, Congress Loses Hundreds of Years of
Experience—but Majority of Incumbents Stick Around, PBS (Nov. 5, 2010),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/11/congress-loses-hundreds-of-years-ofexperience—but-vast-majority-of-incumbents-stick-around.html; Renee Schoof, With GOP
in Charge of House, Environmental Policy Will Shift, MCCLATCHY (Nov. 3, 2010),
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/11/03/103149/with-gop-in-charge-of-house-
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But, what will happen if the United States decides to take domestic and
international action on carbon? What if, in the future, the international community
seeks to harness global forest management to combat climate change through more
aggressive mechanisms than market-based incentives? Even if the United States
were to gain the political will to tackle climate change in such a manner in the
future, the precursor to this Article demonstrated that the U.S. Constitution
establishes potential legal restrictions on its ability to enter into certain types of
international agreements addressing climate change—specifically ones that seek to
implement restrictions on land-use activities traditionally subject to state and local
government regulatory authority, such as private forest management. In other
words, the constitutional division of regulatory authority between the federal and
state governments—that is, federalism—may act as a restraint on Congress’s
Article II treaty power by limiting Congress’s ability to implement treaties through
the passage of federal legislation that would intrude on a regulatory role reserved to
the states under the U.S. Constitution.
Private land-use regulation is just such a role,38 as state governments maintain
the primary responsibility to regulate land use under their authority to exercise the
“police power” for protection of the “general welfare.”39 Some have argued that the
Tenth Amendment of the Constitution places limits on Congress’s regulatory
authority “in ‘traditional areas of state and local authority,’ such as land use . . . .” 40
environmental.html.
38. This assertion is made in the context of a recently developed theory of “Bimodal
Federalism,” which seeks to highlight a disconnect in the scholarly literature regarding how
U.S. federalism may operate or should normatively operate regarding some regulatory
subject matter, and how it actually operates regarding other subject matter. See Blake
Hudson, Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism to Address Transitory and Perpetual
Disasters: The Bimodal Federalism Framework, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1991. This disconnect
revolves around two different conceptions of how federalism operates, or normatively should
operate, in the United States today—“dynamic federalism” and “dual federalism.”
Proponents of dual federalism posit that “the states and the federal government inhabit[]
mutually exclusive spheres of power.” Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic
Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 175 (2006). Proponents of dynamic
federalism, meanwhile,
reject[] any conception of federalism that separates federal and state authority
under the dualist notion that the states need a sphere of authority protected from
the influence of the federal government” and posit that “federal and state
governments function as alternative centers of power and any matter is
presumptively within the authority of both the federal and the state governments.
Id. at 176 (emphasis added). Yet, neither of these theories captures the complete descriptive
picture of U.S. federalism today. Dynamic federalism may certainly be claimed as the status
quo on many regulatory subject matters, and we may be in the midst of transition towards
dynamic federalism on other subject matter. Yet remnants of dual federalism remain. Direct
land-use regulatory authority, including private forest management, is one such remnant. The
federal and state governments, in addition to the judiciary, operate as if there are separate
spheres of governance, and the federal government is currently perceived as having no
constitutional authority to prescriptively direct subnational land-use planning or private
forest management. For further analysis on these points within the Bimodal Federalism
framework, see Hudson, supra.
39. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
40. James R. May, Constitutional Law and the Future of Natural Resource Protection,
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These scholars have noted that “[t]he weight of legal and political opinion holds
that this allocation of power in [the United States] leaves the states in charge of
regulating how private land is used,”41 and that “[l]and use law has always been a
creature of state and local law.”42 The seminal land use regulatory case of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty43 has been described as a “sweeping paean to the supremacy of state
regulation over private property,” 44 while the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
“the States’ traditional and primary power over land . . . use,”45 and that
“[r]egulation of land use . . . is a quintessential state and local power.”46
As noted above, domestic constitutional constraints such as state control over
land-use regulation have important implications for international negotiations. Even
in the absence of political complications that negatively impacted past climate
negotiations, the United States, as well as other countries with which it might
negotiate, may not be willing to enter into certain types of treaties addressing
climate and forests in the presence of domestic constitutional limitations since a
treaty that may not be legally implemented domestically will not be effective.
Indeed, the United States has invoked federalism in past treaty negotiations on a
number of subjects in order to avoid global agreements that might restrict
traditional state regulatory authority—whether the United States had legitimate
constitutional bases for doing so has become the subject of much debate among
constitutional law scholars.47 It seems clear that, as a political matter, the U.S.
in THE EVOLUTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 124, 132 (Lawrence J.
MacDonnell & Sarah F. Bates eds., 2010).
41. JOHN R. NOLAN, PATRICIA E. SALKIN & MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 17 (7th ed. 2008).
42. Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 335 (2003).
43. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
44. PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP, USE,
AND CONSERVATION 967 (2006).
45. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174
(2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30,
44 (1994) (“[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local
governments.”)).
46. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (emphasis added); see also
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982) (“[R]egulation of land use is perhaps
the quintessential state activity.”) (emphasis added). For a more general discussion
distinguishing the permissible, tangential influencing effects of U.S. federal statutes on state
regulation of forests from potentially impermissible federal interference with primary state
authority over forest management, see Hudson II, supra note 5.
47. Professor Bradley has noted that “in a number of instances in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, U.S. officials declined to enter into negotiations concerning private
international law treaties because of a concern that the treaties would infringe on the
reserved powers of the states.” Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American
Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98, 131 32 (2000) (citing Kurt H. Nadelmann,
Ignored State Interests: The Federal Government and International Efforts to Unify Rules of
Private Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 323 (1954); see also HAROLD W. STOKE, THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE FEDERAL STATE 187–88 (1931). Additionally, in the past, the United
States has invoked federalism and states’ rights to avoid international treaties regulating
labor conditions. Bradley, supra, at 132. Perceived federalism limits on the U.S. government
have also been credited with reducing the United States’s bargaining power during
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Congress could certainly test the waters of federal regulatory authority—under the
Commerce Clause or some other enumerated power—and seek to regulate subject
matters previously regulated almost exclusively by state governments (an example
being private forest management). Yet in the United States it seems that “legal
perception becomes political reality,” 48 as the government politically acts as if its
hands are tied due to perceived legal constraints.
As a general matter, U.S. constitutional law scholars are in heated disagreement
as to whether constitutional federalism limitations restrain the treaty power
established in Article II of the U.S. Constitution. 49 In one camp are scholars
asserting that the “new federalism”50 established by recent U.S. Supreme Court
decisions51 confirms the existence of federalism restraints on the United States’s
ability to implement international treaties requiring the passage of federal
legislation that would be unconstitutional if passed in the absence of a treaty—such
as legislation that intrudes into regulatory areas traditionally reserved for the states
under the Constitution.52 This camp stands for the proposition that the treaty power
should be subject to the same federalism limitations that apply to Congress’s other
sources of legislative authority, such as the Commerce Clause, because “the federal
government should not be able to use the treaty power . . . to create domestic law
that could not be created by Congress” in the absence of a treaty.53 This view
follows from Jeffersonian notions of the treaty power’s scope, as Thomas Jefferson
himself wrote that “[the treaty power] must have meant to except out of these the
rights reserved to the states; for surely the President and Senate cannot do by treaty
international negotiations, as the United States has sought both treaty exemptions to reduce
state obligations, and concessions for states in domestic implementation. See Swaine, supra
note 1, at 408–10. Examples include the United States’s direct opposition to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, treaty exemptions for the states with a variety of human rights
treaties and the Agreement on Government Procurement, and concessions to the states in
domestic implementation of trade matters like the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. Id.
48. Hudson, supra note 38, at 2048.
49. For a thorough discussion of this disagreement and its implications, see Hudson II,
supra note 5, at 405–13.
50. See generally Swaine, supra note 1.
51. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
52. See Bradley, supra note 7; Bradley, supra note 47; Fischer, supra note 33; Duncan
B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power,
79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327 (2006); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power,
118 HARV. L. REV. 1867 (2005); Swaine, supra note 1.
53. See Bradley, supra note 7, at 450. Bradley stated that,
[u]nder this approach, the treaty power would not confer any additional
regulatory powers on the federal government, just the power to bind the United
States on the international plane. Thus, for example, it could not be used to
resurrect legislation determined by the Supreme Court to be beyond Congress’s
legislative powers, such as the legislation at issue in the recent New York,
Lopez, Boerne, and Printz decisions.
Id. at 456. Bradley clarifies, however, that his argument “is simply that if federalism is to be
the subject of judicial protection—as the current Supreme Court appears to believe—there is
no justification for giving the treaty power special immunity from such protection.” Id. at
394 (emphasis in original).
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what the whole government is interdicted from doing in any way.” 54 The
implications of this view, of course, are that federalism limits “might leave the
United States with a gap between its international treaty obligations and its ability
to implement them . . . .”55 Even so, constitutional law scholars raise a compelling
argument that “[i]f the national government is indeed supposed to be a creature of
limited authority, shouldn’t the treaty power enjoy boundaries just like any
other?”56
Another camp of constitutional law scholars articulate the “nationalist”
perspective, asserting that for domestic legislation implemented pursuant to an
international treaty, the national government may claim regulatory authority even
over subject matter traditionally regulated by state governments that would
otherwise be beyond the reach of the national government in the absence of a
treaty.57 This camp views the treaty power as an independent power delegated to
the national government, as is the case with the Commerce Clause and other
sources of federal authority. In this way, “nationalists” argue that just as there are
no Tenth Amendment powers “reserved” exclusively for the states for activities
that are found to constitute “commerce between the states” under the Commerce
Clause, there are no Tenth Amendment powers “reserved” exclusively for the states
for activities subject to an international treaty. 58 For non-self-executing treaties that
require domestic legislation that might otherwise be subject to federalism
limitations, such as legislation outside the scope of the Commerce Clause or some
other enumerated federal power, nationalists invoke the Necessary and Proper
Clause, asserting that “it is quite clear that Congress has the power to adopt
legislation executing the provisions of any valid treaty,” and that “[i]f the President
and Senate have the power to conclude treaties on subjects that are beyond the
scope of Congress’s legislative powers, then the Necessary and Proper Clause
makes clear that Congress has the power to adopt legislation implementing the
provisions of such treaties as domestic law.” 59
The “new federalist” versus “nationalist” debate over federalism and the treaty
power is far from over, but its implications should not be overlooked in the global
environmental governance context. Climate change negotiations aimed at forest
practices provide an ideal set of circumstances for studying how the above
constitutional debate plays out in international relations. Because the U.S.
Constitution grants the national government the authority to negotiate treaties, 60

54. Thomas Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice: For the Use of the Senate
of the United States, in JEFFERSON’S PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS 353, 421 (Wilbur Samuel
Howell ed., 1988).
55. Swaine, supra note 1, at 474.
56. Id. at 475.
57. See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations
of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000). Golove
also provides a thorough analysis of the intensity of the debate between new federalists and
nationalists. See id. at 1076–81; see also Hollis, supra note 52, at 1330 31.
58. Golove, supra note 57, at 1087 88.
59. Id. at 1099.
60. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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while state and local governments maintain primary regulatory authority for land
use activities like private forest management, 61
[t]he US’s governmental system of federalism, engrained in the US
Constitution and receiving staunch protection by the US judiciary,
causes domestic implementation of certain international forest
governance scenarios to be more viable than others. . . . US federalism .
. . represents a specific legal constitutional requirement for
decentralization, whereby a national government is judicially required
to divulge regulatory authority to sub-national units (the states) in the
area of direct forest management. 62
Imagine, for instance, that the United States signed and ratified an international
treaty under which the U.S. Congress agreed to pass domestic legislation
establishing nationwide forest management mandates on publicly and privately
owned forest lands. Such mandates might require maintaining partial forest cover
on forested lands, implementing soil erosion reduction programs, establishing
nationwide buffer zones in forested watersheds, or limiting fertilizer use. 63

61. As scholars note, “[u]nder the US Constitution, the federal government has limited
authority and responsibility; all other powers are reserved for the states. Forestland
management and use was one such reserved power.” Rose et al., supra note 31, at 239.
62. Hudson I, supra note 5, at 354–55 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Scholars have described the U.S. Constitution as establishing “a very limited concentration
of powers in the nation’s central institutions. . . . [T]he original allocation of jurisdiction to
the national government was . . . modest with the unspecified, but apparently broad, residue
being left with the states.” Ronald L. Watts, The American Constitution in Comparative
Perspective: A Comparison of Federalism in the United States and Canada, 74 J. AM. HIST.
769, 769 (1987). It is true that, “[t]hough the balance of power between the state and federal
governments shifts periodically in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence—thus leading to court
‘protection’ of states’ rights to a greater or lesser degree than federal power—the judicial
system resolutely protects the principle that is U.S. federalism.” Hudson II, supra note 5, at
383 n.70. As noted by Professor Watts, “[i]n the United States there have been fluctuations
in the relative strengths of the national and state governments . . . .” Watts, supra at 773.
Nonetheless, “the courts and particularly the Supreme Court have come to play a prominent
role through their exercise of judicial review to ensure the constitutionality of legislation and
executive and administrative action relating to . . . the distribution of jurisdiction between the
national and state governments.” Id. at 789.
63. Hudson I, supra note 5, at 358. The IPCC has stated that international agreements on
forests could ensure the implementation of:
[f]orest management activities to increase stand-level forest carbon stocks
include harvest systems that maintain partial forest cover, minimize losses of
dead organic matter (including slash) or soil carbon by reducing soil erosion,
and by avoiding slash burning and other high-emission activities. Planting after
harvest or natural disturbances accelerates tree growth and reduces carbon
losses relative to natural regeneration. Economic considerations are typically
the main constraint, because retaining additional carbon on site delays revenues
from harvest. The potential benefits of carbon sequestration can be diminished
where increased use of fertilizer causes greater N2O emissions.
Gert Jan Nabuurs, Omar Masera, Kenneth Andrasko, Pablo Benitez-Ponce, Rizaldi Boer,
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Congressional legislation implementing the treaty, however, would arguably be an
impermissible intrusion into an area of state regulatory control, thus effectively
prohibiting U.S. participation in the treaty. Based upon current constitutional
understandings, states maintain direct regulatory authority over private forest
management activities under their general “land use” regulatory authority. 64 As a
result, states are responsible for establishing stand density, reforestation, and
riparian buffer zone requirements; governing clear-cutting practices; and
implementing numerous other “best management practices” on state-owned and
private forestlands.65 This division of subnational forest regulatory authority
between the federal and state governments is especially problematic for the United
States; even though central governments own approximately 86% of forests
worldwide,66 the U.S. federal government only owns 35% of U.S. forestland. 67
State governments own 5% of U.S. forests, and private landowners own the
remaining 60%—a significant variance from the global pattern of forest
ownership.68 Furthermore, nearly 89% of U.S. timber is harvested from private
lands.69 Thus,
a global governance scenario that required that “within x number of
years, treaty participants must increase and maintain forest area by 25
percent and implement active carbon sequestration projects on 50
percent of their forested lands” may not be viable under the U.S. federal
system because the U.S. government arguably would be unable to
ensure compliance with the mandate on even a majority of forested
lands within its borders. . . . State governments would claim sole
authority to pass laws prescribing increased forest density and carbon

Michael Dutschke, Elnour Elsiddig, Justin Ford-Robertson, Peter Frumhoff, Timo
Karjalainen, Olga Krankina, Werner A. Kurz, Mitsuo Matsumoto, Walter Oyhantcabai,
Ravindranath N.H., Maria José Sanz Sanchez & Xiaquan Zhang, Forestry, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 541, 551 (Bert Mertz et al. eds., 2007),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg3/en/ch9.html.
64. See supra note 61 and accompanying text; supra note 39.
65. See JAN G. LAITOS, SANDRA B. ZELLMER, MARY C. WOOD & DANIEL H. COLE,
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 849 (2006). Despite maintaining the regulatory authority to do
so, most states do not even legally place forest management standards upon private forest
managers. Scholars have noted that “[a]lthough a few states have laws that regulate forest
practices on private land, most rely upon voluntary best management practices and technical
assistance.” Rose et al., supra note 31, at 238 (emphasis added).
66. See Arun Agrawal, Ashwini Chhatre & Rebecca Hardin, Changing Governance of
the World’s Forests, 320 SCIENCE 1460, 1460 (2008).
67. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, supra note 15, at 110.
68. See id.
69. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., U.S. FOREST FACTS AND HISTORICAL TRENDS 7 (Sept. 2001),
available at http://fia.fs.fed.us/library/briefings-summaries-overviews/docs/ForestFacts
Metric.pdf. Carbon flux, or the net difference between carbon removal and carbon addition
to the atmosphere, is 50% greater on public forestlands in the United States than on private
forestlands, most likely resulting “from greater land use conversions and disturbance
(including timber harvest) on private forests relative to public forests.” WHITE & ALIG, supra
note 12, at 9–10.
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sequestration requirements on the remaining 65 percent of forests either
on private lands or in state ownership.70
Whether federalism limits the U.S. treaty power in the case of forests and
climate is further complicated by the fact that the seminal U.S. constitutional case
on the issue provides little clarity, due to its narrow facts. Though decided in 1920,
Missouri v. Holland71 remains the point of reference for determining the treaty
power’s scope in allowing national government regulation of natural resources and
other subject matter traditionally regulated by the states. Indeed, Professor Henkin
framed Holland as “perhaps the most famous and most discussed case in the
constitutional law of foreign affairs.” 72
Holland arose out of a treaty signed on December 8, 1916 by the United States
and Great Britain, recognizing that “many species of birds in their annual
migrations traversed certain parts of the United States and of Canada . . . were of
great value as a source of food and in destroying insects injurious to vegetation, but
were in danger of extermination through lack of adequate protection.” 73 To
implement the treaty domestically, the United States passed the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act (MBTA)74 to prohibit the killing, capturing, or selling of migratory birds
covered by the treaty.75 The state of Missouri challenged the federal government’s
authority to enforce the MBTA, arguing that the act unconstitutionally interfered
with the rights reserved for the states under the Tenth Amendment, 76 and
additionally that states traditionally controlled the management of wildlife
resources.77 The federal government responded by asserting the supremacy of its
constitutional treaty power—and correspondingly all domestic legislation passed
pursuant to it—over the state’s claimed authority. 78
The Supreme Court resolved the dispute by first noting the supremacy of federal
laws passed pursuant to the treaty power established in Article VI of the
Constitution, finding that “[i]f the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the
validity of the [MBTA] under Article 1, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to
execute the powers of the Government.”79 The Court found that the MBTA did not
violate any specific portion of the Constitution, and should be upheld unless it was
prohibited by the Tenth Amendment under the facts of the case. 80 The Court stated
that “[t]he language of the Constitution as to the supremacy of treaties being
general, the question before us is narrowed to an inquiry into the ground upon

70. Hudson II, supra note 5, at 400 (citation omitted).
71. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
72. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 190 (2d
ed. 1996).
73. Holland, 252 U.S. at 431.
74. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2006).
75. Holland, 252 U.S. at 431.
76. Id. at 430–31.
77. See id. at 430.
78. See id. at 432.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 433 34.
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which the present supposed exception is placed,”81 and that “[n]o doubt the great
body of private relations usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty
may override its power. . . . [I]t only remains to consider the application of
established rules to the present case.” 82 The Court ultimately determined that the
specific facts of the case did not warrant overturning the MTBA on Tenth
Amendment grounds. In doing so, the Court focused on the migratory nature of the
birds (being owned by no particular party) and the national interest at stake as
weakening the state’s claim of sole regulatory authority over the resource. 83 In
other words, the resource at issue crossed international boundaries, and thus
Congress could act without violating the Tenth Amendment since the resource
could be adequately managed “only by national action in concert with that of
another power.”84
The narrow fact pattern presented in Holland, however, is distinguishable from
that which would be presented by private forests. Private forest management has
traditionally been considered a land use activity subject to the exclusive regulatory
authority of state governments and otherwise reserved for the states under the
Tenth Amendment.85 Furthermore, forests differ from wildlife because the federal
government has never before sought regulatory inputs into direct private forest
management practices, forests are owned by identifiable public and private entities,
and forests are not migratory resources. Finally, “the history of state control over
private forest management (and land use generally) demonstrates that the federal
government customarily has not been considered a necessary party to private forest
management—and forests are not ‘protected only by national action in concert with
that of another power.’”86 As a result, the fact-specific nature of the Holland
analysis, combined with recently revived principles of “new federalism,”
potentially renders Holland of very little precedential value in defending domestic
implementation of an international treaty prescribing private forest management
standards.
A number of scholars agree that Holland may be limited to its facts, noting that
“although Holland has been construed as giving the treaty power complete
immunity from federalism limitations, the decision itself can be read much more
narrowly,”87 and that “there is a substantial risk that subject-matter limitations . . .
[may be] applied to the exercise of the treaty power. While Missouri v. Holland
may survive for the foreseeable future, it will likely be read narrowly.” 88 Or, as
summarized by one scholar,

81. Id. at 432.
82. Id. at 434 35.
83. The Court noted that “[w]ild birds are not in the possession of anyone . . . [t]he
whole foundation of the State’s rights is the presence within their jurisdiction of birds that
yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow may be in another State and in a week a thousand miles
away.” Id. at 434.
84. Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
85. Rose et al., supra note 31, at 239; see supra text accompanying note 61.
86. Hudson II, supra note 5, at 417 (emphasis in original).
87. Bradley, supra note 7, at 459.
88. Swaine, supra note 1, at 412.
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[T]he expansive, nationalist view of the treaty power is unlikely to
survive sustained analysis intact and will likely be cabined by some
type of limiting principle. . . . [T]he Supreme Court will be forced to
reexamine in a serious way, for the first time in nearly eighty years, an
ill-defined, poorly understood constitutional doctrine (the nationalist
view) . . . . It only seems prudent to anticipate that instead of feeling
inexorably bound by relatively moribund precedent, the Court will
instead endeavor to assimilate the treaty power into the revived
federalism that it has put forward with such frequency. 89
Yet another scholar is even more direct, stating that “Missouri v. Holland may be
canonical, but it does not present a strong case for the application of stare decisis. It
is wrongly decided and should be overruled.”90
Ultimately, a strong argument exists that under current understandings of U.S.
constitutional law the U.S. federal government would be constrained from entering
into and implementing an international climate treaty that sought a certain threshold
of control over forest management activities because nearly two-thirds of U.S.
forests are under subnational regulatory authority. 91 In this way, “U.S. federalism is
predisposed to conflict with principles of international law, not only in the
negotiation of treaties, but perhaps more importantly in the implementation of
treaties governing areas considered the subject of traditional state authority, like
forest management.”92
The United States is not alone, however, in its status as a federal system
potentially constrained in international climate negotiations by subnational units of
government. Professor Swaine has noted that, “[f]ederal states not infrequently
seek broader concessions based on the political feasibility of national
implementation, but the arguments that have had purchase are based on more
genuine constitutional limits. Much the same may be said with respect to . . .
outright . . . refusals to participate based on federalism grounds.” 93 Indeed,
numerous other federal systems control important forest resources worldwide and
present potential difficulties for international negotiations. As a result, a variety of
countries at the negotiating table could each be legally constrained in domestic
treaty implementation.

89. Fischer, supra note 33, at 186.
90. Rosenkranz, supra note 52, at 1937.
91. See supra text accompanying note 15. As a short-term means of avoiding the
negative effects of such a restraint, scholars have argued:
it is apparent that . . . a global forest treaty based upon “traditional governance”
and prescriptive mandates that may run afoul of federalism principles in the
United States [should be avoided]. Market-based initiatives like REDD, forest
certification, and ecosystem service transaction programs would provide the
best opportunity to achieve global forest management goals and would do so
with the uncompromised leadership and participation of the United States.
Hudson II, supra note 5, at 428–29.
92. Hudson II, supra note 5, at 395. For a broader discussion on the tension between
U.S. federalism and international law and treaty obligations, see id., Part II.D.
93. Swaine, supra note 1, at 445 46; see also Hollis, supra note 52, at 1327 28.
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The next Part introduces and describes the three elements of federal
constitutional orders that allow these systems to avoid such difficulties at the global
scale while at the same time preserving the benefits of sustainable decentralized
forest governance on local scales—a necessary precursor to Part III’s comparative
analysis of the constitutional orders of Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, and Russia
in the context of forest management. Part III’s analysis permits a determination of
which of the three elements from Part II each system currently maintains. This
descriptive analysis in turn allows for both a better understanding of the potential
consequences that federal constitutional structure may have for climate change
negotiations, as well as an indication of which federal systems maintain
constitutional orders that would require adjustment to strike the difficult balance
between global climate governance and decentralized forest management.
II. ELEMENTS OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS THAT BEST BALANCE
GLOBAL FOREST GOVERNANCE AND DECENTRALIZED FOREST POLICY MAKING
Though the potential for subnational governments to place constitutional
constraints on national governments may cause federal systems to present more
difficulties for international climate negotiations than do unitary systems of
government, it is a mistake to assume that federal systems uniformly do so. The
federal systems assessed in Part III below maintain constitutions that vary greatly
in their allocation of constitutional authority over forest management between the
national and subnational governments. In fact, certain federal systems maintain
constitutions that allow their involvement in climate change negotiations to
approximate the operation of unitary systems of government—at least from a legal
perspective—and even to facilitate potentially more effective treaty implementation
than unitary systems as the benefits of decentralized forest management may be
more readily achieved in federal systems that are already constitutionally
decentralized.
To most effectively balance decentralized forest governance in federal systems
with successful negotiation and implementation of a treaty aimed at forest
management, however, federal systems must maintain three key elements: (1)
national constitutional primacy over both national and subnational forest policy, (2)
national sharing of constitutional authority over forest policy with subnational
governments, and (3) forest policy institutional enforcement capacity. The
following description of these three elements provides context for Part III’s survey
of which federal systems here reviewed currently maintain all or some of these
elements. Likewise, the survey in Part III will make more clear the meaning and
implications of each of these elements through the provision of tangible examples.
A. National Constitutional Primacy over Forest Policy
When the present needs are especially urgent, and local costs of
exploitation are not immediately incurred, resources are exploited.
Achieving positive environmental and social outcomes requires
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standards and means for ensuring that nationally defined environmental
and social concerns are taken into account. 94
“National constitutional primacy” is a term this Article introduces to describe
the attribute of a federal system whereby the national government maintains
constitutional authority to guide regulatory or management standards for a resource
that may be the subject of domestic legislation passed pursuant to an international
treaty—here, forest management included within a climate treaty. National
constitutional primacy over forest policy is a key element for federal system
participation in such a treaty for the simple reason that a national government
ultimately unconstrained by subnational interference in domestic policy can more
freely arrange its international obligations. To be clear, the introduction of this
element is not advocating an evisceration of decentralized forest policy. 95 Indeed,
as discussed in Part II.B below, the numerous benefits of decentralized forest
governance are well documented: reduction of central government bureaucracy
resulting in more efficient decision making; better access to local knowledge
leading to increased understanding of local needs and constraints; better
information flow between local and central governments, as well as between the
government and private sector; greater local cooperation and stakeholder interest in
governance participation; and reduction of central government “political meddling”
and corruption.96 Each of these is a crucial component to effective resource
governance on local, national, and international scales.

94. Jesse C. Ribot, Choosing Representation: Institutions and Powers for Decentralized
Natural Resources Management, in THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, POWER
AND PEOPLE, supra note 8, at 86, 98.
95. As a general matter, scholars maintain mixed views on the value of forest policy
decentralization, and the means by which it occurs, with some arguing
for slowing the pace [of decentralization] in order to give governments and
citizens a chance to adapt to the new features of a decentralized approach;
others suggest that local governments and citizens will become adept at dealing
with their new powers only by using them. Although [scholars] see the
potential value of decentralization, some favour a stronger central role and
others a stronger local role, in the balance of power. Some show more faith in
communities’ management abilities, some have less.
Jürgen Blaser, Christian Küchli, Carol J. Pierce Colfer & Doris Capistrano, Introduction, in
THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, POWER AND PEOPLE, supra note 8, at 1, 5.
96. See Gregersen et al., supra note 8, at 27–28. Other scholars have noted that the
primary arguments for decentralization are that
decentralization produces more just and equitable outcomes and that localized
control is more functional than state control. Put simply, consultation and
collaboration with social movements and voluntary associations provides an
effective means of harnessing local knowledge and agency in both plan making
and implementation. Engaged civic actors can also act as a check on state
power—thus helping to democratize governance—and offer a counterpoint to
its limited rationalist worldview.
Marcus B. Lane, Decentralization or Privatization of Environmental Governance? Forest
Conflict and Bioregional Assessment in Australia, 19 J. RURAL STUD. 283, 284 85 (2003)
(emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). These benefits track the noted benefits of federalism
generally, as summarized by Professor Rosenn: federalism promotes economic growth,
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Despite these well-recognized, tangible benefits of decentralized local forest
governance, scholars have noted that,
while there is a trend toward decentralization of forest governance
within many countries, there also are developing clear arguments for
mechanisms, central or even international (e.g. through global
conventions), to ensure that activities and events that affect more than
one state and that are involved in the production of national or global
public goods associated with the environmental services derived from
forests are being adequately considered by those with the mandate to
manage them.97
Indeed, climate change has been perhaps the foremost driver for “clear arguments”
against “over-decentralization,” as the role of forests in regulating global
atmospheric carbon has been increasingly recognized over the last twenty years.
Suddenly the aggregated effects of decentralized, local decision making regarding
forest resources have taken on global significance, as sequestration of carbon is
perhaps the most important “environmental service” performed by forests in
modern times. In short, “[d]ecentralization offers great opportunities for improved
forest management, but also great challenges. It is far from being a final solution to
the ills of the forest sector because significant possible disadvantages and dangers
threaten its potential benefits.”98 National constitutional primacy provides a check
on these well-recognized disadvantages of decentralized forest governance, which
include making more difficult the coordination and implementation of national
policies, undermining national objectives when local objectives are not consistent,
decision making at local levels that is not socially or environmentally desirable or
sustainable, loss of noncommercial objectives of national forest policy, and
pressure to extract forest resources for immediate local benefit to the detriment of
long term sustainability, to name a few.99
National governments in federal systems often maintain regulatory
responsibility for forest resource issues that have effects across subnational
boundaries or that provide national or international ecosystem services and public

reciprocity in the enforcement of the law, safeguard against the potential tyranny of
centralized power, encouragement of local citizen participation in governance,
experimentation with new forms of governance (“laboratories for experimentation”), and
administrative efficiency as decentralized governments can specifically tailor laws to fit
local needs. Keith S. Rosenn, Federalism in the Americas in Comparative Perspective, 26 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 6 7 (1994).
97. GREGERSEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 8–9.
98. Gregersen et al., supra note 8, at 29.
99. See id. at 28. Other noted problems are failure to achieve economies of scale,
potential increase in arbitrariness and corruption, and the potential for local elites to control
decentralized institutions. See id. These negatives track the noted pitfalls with federalism
generally, as summarized by Professor Rosenn—that federalism makes governance of
problems that transcend subnational boundaries more difficult, creates economic inefficiency
as overlapping laws conflict, causes a race to the bottom among states competing for
business and growth, imposes penalties on citizens of neighboring states, creates redundant
governance, disenfranchises local minorities at the expense of local majorities, and causes
overall instability. See Rosenn, supra note 96, at 7 8.
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goods, and “[o]ften, the federal government influences or controls state activity
through federal laws, incentives and checks and balances related to the use of
resources.”100 Even so, some federal systems controlling vast forest resources do
not maintain a constitutional framework for broad national forest policy
formulation that ensures the benefits of decentralized management are maximized
in balance with national or global provision of public goods. Pursuing mechanisms
for addressing this constitutional gap in these systems is important, as the policy
goals of decentralized forest management may best be achieved if federal systems
will “[i]dentify which national policies should override the preferences of
decentralized bodies and establish clear rules for their enforcement at [the] national
level” and “[e]stablish forest management minimum standards for decentralized
institutions.”101 In fact, a report issued to the Fourth UNFF by participants of the
Interlaken decentralization workshop stated as one of the guiding principles of
effective forest policy decentralization implementation that “[d]ecentralization in
the forest sector should not be implemented in isolation from a general national
forestry strategy, such as national forest programmes.” 102
Given the importance of a national government’s ability to spur effective
decentralized forest governance, what this Article argues best facilitates federal
nation-state agreement on global forest governance is not direct national control per
se over forest policy at all levels, but rather national constitutional authority to act
as a safety net—a function that may be termed “Fail-safe Federalism.”103 In other
words, “national constitutional primacy” denotes national governments maintaining
legal authority to guide forest policy—including the ability to enter into
international climate and forest treaties unconstrained—while leaving subnational
governments with primary regulatory and management roles. 104 To be certain, too
much national control over forest management can also be detrimental to forest
governance. Scholars note that “[c]entral governments . . . commonly maintain
control over forest management through extensive bureaucratic procedures, such as
forest management plans, price controls, marketing and permits for cutting,
transport and processing. In some cases this represents a loss of local
decision-making authority . . . .”105 Rather, the type of national constitutional

100. Gregersen, supra note 8, at 15.
101. Id. at 28 29.
102. Doris Capistrano & Carol J. Pierce Colfer, Decentralization: Issues, Lessons and
Reflections, in THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, POWER AND PEOPLE, supra
note 8, at 296, 311.
103. See generally Blake Hudson, Fail-Safe Federalism and Climate Change: The Case
of U.S. and Canadian Forest Policy, 44 CONN. L. REV. 925 (2012).
104. This approach would be consistent with principles of dynamic federalism. See supra
note 38.
105. Anne M. Larson, Democratic Decentralization in the Forestry Sector: Lessons
Learned from Africa, Asia and Latin America, in THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION:
FORESTS, POWER AND PEOPLE, supra note 8, at 32, 36. Some scholars have noted that “[t]he
role of national government is to ensure that the many micro-level management decisions of
local community governments aggregate into a coherent policy, not to mandate a policy in
ways that disrupt and marginalize the community members who ultimately form the
state/forest interface.” Craig Segall, Note, The Forestry Crisis as a Crisis of the Rule of Law,
58 STAN. L. REV. 1539, 1549 (2006).
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primacy that can most effectively balance global governance with the benefits of
subnational decentralized policy is that which establishes a minimum forest
management standards framework within which subnational governments may
operate with discretion,106 and which subnational governments can supplement with
even higher standards if they so choose. Importantly, as discussed in this Article’s
conclusion, national constitutional primacy need not flow out of top-down,
prescriptive constitutional mandates at the national level, as it can arise bilaterally
out of cooperative federalism arrangements or even horizontally out of regional
agreements among subnational governments. 107
Achieving the appropriate degree of national government oversight is crucial
because “[a]lthough too much oversight of local governments can be detrimental,
checks and balances on local authority over forests are essential for good
governance and to protect resources.” 108 Other scholars note that,
even where secure decentralization has been implemented, support
from central government and others are needed to ensure that natural
resources are not over-exploited . . . . Some of these efforts include
minimum environmental standards . . . . Central government must play
a key role in advancing reforms needed to achieve effective
decentralization.109
Stated differently, “simply devolving power to communities can produce either no
positive change or even negative change, if devolution reduces the power of the
national government to stop local resource misuse that might once have been
limited by national policy.”110
Ultimately, scholars who are well aware of the value of decentralized forest
policy recognize that a “minimum standards” approach is “an important role of
central governments,” because,
minimum environmental standards are a complementary means of
codifying . . . principles [of decentralization] in law, thus establishing
greater local autonomy in natural resources management and use. The
minimum-standards approach complements decentralization by
specifying the boundaries to the domain of local autonomy without
restricting discretion within those boundaries . . . .
A minimum environmental standards approach—a set of restrictions
and guidelines for environmental use and management—would replace

106. See Larson, supra note 105, at 36. Scholars have noted that “[e]lected forest
councils in Kumaon, India, have historically operated under such an arrangement. They have
an important autonomous decision-making space within rules and limits established by the
central government . . . . The upward, as well as downward, accountability of the councils
has been important to their success.” Id.
107. See Hudson, supra note 38.
108. Larson, supra note 105, at 43.
109. Ribot, supra note 94, at 89–90.
110. Segall, supra note 105, at 1556.
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the centrally directed micromanagement approach currently exercised
through elaborate plans and planning processes.111
The type of Fail-safe Federalism facilitated by national constitutional primacy
strikes a balance between centralized planning and minimum standards at the
federal level and decentralized implementation, harnessing of local information and
expertise, and other benefits at the subnational level.
Despite the importance of Fail-safe Federalism and minimum national
standards, national government involvement in federal system decentralized forest
policy cannot be divined from thin air. If a federal constitution does not permit
national constitutional primacy over forest policy at all levels (as is arguably the
case in the United States where the national government only maintains primacy
over 35% of forests) then the benefits of decentralized management may not be
balanced with the provision of national environmental goods and other goals—at
the very least there will be no legal mechanism for ensuring that they are. Equally
important, protection of global goods provided by forests, such as climate change
regulation via forest carbon sequestration, may not be facilitated by an international
treaty because key federal systems may refuse to participate based upon domestic
constitutional concerns. Thus, national constitutional primacy provides a legal
mechanism that facilitates the benefits of both decentralized management and
responsible centralized forest planning in a way that is realized not only by the
individual nation, but by the international community engaged in creating effective
solutions to global environmental problems such as climate change. 112
B. National Sharing of Constitutional Forest Authority
National sharing of constitutional forest authority can be summarized simply as
a national government maintaining constitutional primacy over forest policy at both
national and subnational levels, while at the same time voluntarily and
cooperatively sharing that authority with subnational governments to achieve the
most effective management on localized scales. It is, in effect, the other side of the
“national constitutional primacy” coin—a federal system cannot maintain this
element unless it first maintains national constitutional primacy over forest
management. A federal system may, on the other hand, maintain national
constitutional primacy and choose to “overcentralize” national forest policy by
refusing to share that authority with subnational governments in a way that is
consistent with theories of dynamic federalism. 113 From a treaty negotiation
standpoint, having legal authority to implement domestic policy allows a national
government to enter into an international agreement unconstrained, while its
willingness to share decentralized forest management responsibilities facilitates

111. Ribot, supra note 94, at 98.
112. Centralized forest planning not only facilitates international agreement, but also
provides consistent policy across subnational borders and the prevention of a “race to the
bottom” or “tragedy of the commons” in subnational forest policy. Blake Hudson,
Commerce in the Commons: A Unified Theory of Natural Capital Regulation Under the
Commerce Clause, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 375 (2011).
113. See supra note 38.
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more effective domestic implementation of the agreement. Even outside the context
of an international agreement, this element also aligns the benefits of sustainable
decentralized forest policy with the provision of global goods and services, since
the national government is more likely to value a wider range of forest goods and
services than do individual subnational governments. Ultimately, this sharing of
authority is crucial, as a condition of good decentralized forest governance is
“[e]ffective and balanced distribution of forest related responsibilities and authority
among levels of government” and “[c]ertain forest management decisions are better
made at the subnational, or even local levels of government, while others may best
be retained at a central level.”114 In other words, this element allows the national
government to act as the aforementioned fail-safe via a “minimum standards”
approach without giving rise to the myriad of problems caused by a national
government that micromanages policy decisions on local scales.
As noted above, suitable responsibilities to be maintained by the national
government include providing coherent forest management on issues that may have
spillover effects across political and geographic boundaries of subnational units and
the provision of national and even international goods and services. There is a need
for “strong central government guidance and overall leadership,” and
“[d]ecentralized forest management does not mean less need for a strong central
government.”115 Nonetheless, in order to preserve the resource management gains
made during the global shift toward decentralized forest policy, it is important that
even in the presence of constitutional authority to do so, national governments in
federal systems do not overcentralize in a way that usurps forest policy decisions
best left to subnational governments.
Ultimately, national governments that are limited in their ability to implement a
treaty effectively on domestic scales will be less inclined to enter into an
international agreement—rendering national constitutional primacy of great
importance. National sharing of constitutional forest authority, however, achieves
the crucial balance of ensuring that international obligations to which the national
government can unilaterally agree are domestically carried out in the most effective
manner possible and in a way that is most consistent with the federal form of
governance chosen by many nations controlling crucial forest resources.
C. Institutional Enforcement Capacity
Scholars have noted that “forest governance is strongly dependent on the
institutional and political conditions of the government in general”116 and that
“[c]losing the gap between law and on-ground outcomes is one of the main
challenges in the forest sector . . . so issues of enforcement and compliance are

114. CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA ET AL., supra note 17, at 7.
115. Id. This is because “[u]ncoordinated decisions on forest management taken at
sub-national levels of government may weaken national policy coherence.” Arnoldo
Contreras-Hermosilla, Hans M. Gregersen & Andy White, Forest Governance in Countries
with Federal Systems of Government: Lessons and Implications for Decentralization, CTR.
FOR INT’L FORESTRY RES., FORESTS AND GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME 2008, at 12, available at
http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_files/Books/BContreras-Hermosilla0701.pdf.
116. CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA ET AL., supra note 17, at 4.
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amongst the most important arenas of policy analysis.” 117 Indeed, institutional
enforcement capacity118 is a crucial element for federal-system treaty agreement
and implementation for another obvious reason—without the ability to adequately
enforce domestic policy, international obligations cannot be met, and, therefore,
national governments will be less likely to agree to obligations in the first instance.
It is true that “[r]elationships between the central and sub-national governments are
never constant in a country and changes are to be expected in a democratic country
with a federal system of government.” 119 Yet these political shifts in ability or
willingness to implement national policies are distinct from having a constitutional,
legal capacity to do so.
As seen below, federal systems without adequate institutional enforcement
capacity over forest management are hampered by unclear constitutional divisions
of power between national and subnational governments, and between branches of
the national government, and are further subject to corruption and other
institutional maladies—resulting in direct, negative effects on international
negotiations. A thorough assessment of institutional environmental enforcement
problems is beyond the scope of this Article, and is otherwise thoroughly
documented in the literature. It is important, however, to introduce this element
here since, unfortunately, certain federal systems analyzed below maintain the first
two key constitutional elements for facilitating climate treaty agreement and
implementation but lack institutional enforcement capacity.
Part III now undertakes a comparative constitutional assessment of different
federal systems that control important forest resources to analyze which systems
maintain the key elements presented thus far.
III. IMPACTS OF SELECT FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL FOREST AND
CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS: SURVEY OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AND FOREST
OWNERSHIP
As noted in Figure 1, above, federal nations controlling important forest
resources enter international climate negotiations from widely divergent
positions—both with regard to the division of constitutional authority over forest
policy, as well as to the public-private allocation of forest ownership. Some federal
constitutions place constitutional regulatory authority over all of a nation’s forests
in the hands of the national government, which presents fewer difficulties for
global climate change governance as national governments can act without
constitutional constraints during international negotiations. Other federal
constitutions can be interpreted as authorizing virtually exclusive subnational
government regulation of a vast majority of the nation’s forests, effectively
prohibiting a prescriptive regulatory role for the national government in setting
management standards. While this approach limits the national government’s
ability to bind the nation to a treaty aimed at forests, it may better facilitate

117. MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 21.
118. “Capacity” is here defined as “the ability of . . . governments to carry out their
mandates.” Larson, supra note 105, at 50.
119. Contreras-Hermosilla et al., supra note 115, at 22.
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sustainable decentralized forest governance since it provides legal protection from
the disadvantages of overcentralization. In addition, private forests make up a
majority of the forested land in some federal systems, with private forest
management subject to exclusive subnational constitutional control; while in other
systems, private and even subnationally owned forests may be subject to national
regulatory authority. Various other federal systems fall somewhere in between
these extremes of constitutional authority and forest ownership.
The following review describes which federal systems come from which
divergent position in order to gain insight into the impacts those systems’ domestic
constitutional structures have on international climate negotiations. The review
suggests that the federal systems here assessed; Australia, Brazil, Canada, India,
and Russia—along with the United States via comparative analysis—can
effectively be placed into three categories (Chart 1 below), based upon their
retention of certain key elements discussed in Part II. Nations with all three
elements provide models of federal systems that are most capable of engaging in
global forest governance balanced with the realities of domestic federalism and the
protection of local forest goods and services.
A. Australia
1. Constitutional Primacy, National Sharing, and Institutional Enforcement
The Australian Constitution provides no explicit environmental regulatory
authority to either the national (or “Commonwealth”) government or the states and
territories.120 As such—similarly to the United States—general authority to protect
the environment is vested in the states,121 and state and territory governments
generally maintain constitutional authority to establish the legal and policy
framework under which both public and private forests are managed. 122 A
governance structure where subnational governments maintain primacy over
domestic forest policy might be expected, as in the United States, to result in a
domestic legal roadblock to the formation and implementation of an international
treaty aimed at forest management activities.
Unlike the United States, however, the Australian High Court has definitively
ruled that the Australian national government can gain regulatory authority over
any subject matter if such regulation is based upon an international treaty, even if in
an area of traditional state constitutional authority—a very different outcome than
the much narrower result of Holland.123 The Australian High Court, in

120. JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
(2d ed. 2009).
121. Id. at 172.
122. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., NATIONAL FOREST POLICY STATEMENT: A NEW FOCUS
FOR AUSTRALIA’S FORESTS 1 (1995), available at http://www.daff.gov.au/__data/assets/
pdf_file/0019/37612/nat_nfps.pdf; see also Ferguson & Chandrasekharan, supra note 16, at
75 (stating that “[u]nder Australia’s constitution, administration of all matters of land
management, including forestry, were delegated to the provinces”).
123. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Australian Constitution is silent regarding whether
the federal and state governments have shared, or whether either has exclusive, authority to
AND POLICY 171
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Commonwealth v. Tasmania,124 “confirmed the Commonwealth’s authority to
intervene in the management of natural resources in order to meet its international
obligations” and “reinforced an earlier High Court decision . . . which set the
Commonwealth’s international obligations above state’s rights.”125 The
constitutional power upon which the Tasmania decision was based is Section 51 of
the Australian Constitution, the “external affairs” power, which grants the
Commonwealth government the authority to pass laws governing “external
affairs.”126 As a result, the Australian national government can now “legislate
comprehensively in respect of state properties in reliance on an international
treaty,”127 and “Parliament does not lack power to implement treaties to which
Australia is or intends to become a party, whatever the subject matter.”128
Regarding Tasmania and related cases, scholars have argued that,
[o]ver time, the legal and political implications of these decisions
became clear: environmental policy was a jurisdiction shared by both
the states and the Commonwealth. In time, this led to increased
institutional experimentation at the national level to cope with the
‘forestry question’ (sic). A variety of new land management
arrangements emerged, including new policies and structures of
management.129
Ultimately, the Australian High Court’s jurisprudence firmly establishes that the
Australian national government, when acting pursuant to an international treaty,
has constitutional primacy over decentralized forest policy (element 1). 130
As a result, even though subnational governments maintain primary
constitutional authority for regulating forests in Australia, the Commonwealth and
its agencies have exercised increasing influence over forest governance in the

negotiate and implement treaties. See Brian R. Opeskin & Donald R. Rothwell, The Impact
of Treaties on Australian Federalism, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (1995). For a
discussion of the implications of this constitutional difference, see Cyril Robert Emery,
Treaty Solutions from the Land Down Under: Reconciling American Federalism and
International Law, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 115, 125 (2005); Julia Yoo, Note,
Participation in the Making of Legislative Treaties: The United States and Other Federal
Systems, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 455, 487 (2003).
124. (1983) 158 CLR 1 (Austl.).
125. Marcus B. Lane, Regional Forest Agreements: Resolving Resource Conflicts or
Managing Resource Politics?, 37 AUSTL. GEOGRAPHICAL STUD. 142, 144 (1999) (citing
Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168 (Austl.)).
126. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 51 (xxix).
127. Opeskin & Rothwell, supra note 123, at 31.
128. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
129. Lane, supra note 96, at 287 (citation omitted). Also noting that the High Court has
consistently upheld Commonwealth involvement in forest policy as “in keeping with its
constitutional powers for trade and foreign affairs.” Id.
130. Scholars have argued that “[t]he U.S. legal environment is substantially different
from that in Australia. While the Australian High Court has consistently favored the federal
government’s ability to make and implement treaties, the [U.S.] Supreme Court has applied
limits to the U.S. federal government’s power in a variety of areas . . . .” Emery, supra note
123, at 151.
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states,131 and “the politics of federalism” have had “an important impact on forest
policy.”132 Indeed, forest conflicts in Australia have been “at the forefront of
altering the character of federal relations in Australia.” 133 Commonwealth v.
Tasmania and related cases involving federal intervention in areas of traditional
state sovereignty134 have “had a profound impact on the distribution of power
within the Australian federation” and have “substantial implications for Australian
federalism,”135 as they establish “an expansive view of the Commonwealth’s power
to implement treaties to which Australia is a party by enacting appropriate domestic
legislation.”136 Consequently, the Australian government is “constitutionally and
legally empowered to act on environmental matters” 137 and is “increasingly
politically obliged to involve itself in contentious matters of natural resource
policy,”138 especially since “an expectation was created within the environmental
movement that it could now appeal to the Commonwealth against any state
decision.”139 In other words,
the nature of Australian federalism has been fundamentally altered.
Whereas it had long been assumed that natural resource policy was a
state jurisdiction and that the Australian government had a coordinating function in which each level of government had distinct

131. Ian S. Ferguson, Australian Forest Services: Institutions of Change or Changing
Institutions?, 75 COMMONWEALTH FORESTRY REV. 136 (1996). Scholars have noted that
“[i]ncreasingly, the national government has used its powers to influence outcomes at a
provincial or district level . . . .” Ferguson & Chandrasekharan, supra note 16, at 76.
132. Lane, supra note 96, at 287.
133. Id. (citation omitted).
134. See, e.g., Richardson v Forestry Commission (1988) 164 CLR 261 (Austl.);
Queensland v Commonwealth (1985) 159 CLR 192 (Austl.). Scholars note that these High
Court cases “further expanded the scope of the external affairs power” and “had substantial
implications for Australian federalism because the Commonwealth Parliament had never
before been able to legislate comprehensively in respect of state properties in reliance on an
international treaty. The Commonwealth Parliament also gained expanded powers over the
environment.” Opeskin & Rothwell, supra note 123, at 30 31. For further discussion of
these cases, see id. at 33 42.
135. Opeskin & Rothwell, supra note 123, at 10, 31.
136. Id. at 42. Scholars have asserted that,
the current position is that irrespective of whether or not a treaty is
representative of international concern or that it contains an international
obligation upon State Parties, the mere acceptance of the treaty by Australia is a
sufficient basis for the Commonwealth to rely on the terms of the treaty to enact
implementing legislation.
Id.
137. Lane, supra note 125, at 145. Australia’s 1995 National Forest Policy Statement
acknowledges this federal authority, citing international agreements and acts of Parliament
requiring federal government involvement in land use decision-making regarding forests.
See NATIONAL FOREST POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 122, at 19 20.
138. Lane, supra note 125, at 145 (citation omitted); see also NATIONAL FOREST POLICY
STATEMENT, supra note 122, at 19 20; Lane, supra note 96, at 287.
139. Lane, supra note 125, at 144.
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jurisdictions, it was now clear that the states shared resource policy
with the Commonwealth in a concurrent federation.140
Take, for example, the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act
(Conservation Act),141 passed by the Australian national government in 1999 in
order to “allow Australian Government involvement in environmental matters,”
and particularly management of native forests. 142 Because the Conservation Act
invokes powers constitutionally reserved for the states, some of its sections are not
applied in the presence of political agreements between the federal and state
governments.143 The Conservation Act, however, is just one component of an
increasing trend of federal involvement in forest matters, as “[s]everal national
issues, including climate change, environmental heritage, water conservation and
the protection of endangered species, have become more important since the
implementation of the National Forest Policy Statement of 1992,” and “[s]everal
stakeholders are interested in having increased Australian Government intervention
to coordinate a strategy to address the national issues that are independent” of
political agreements between the federal and state governments (that is, cooperative
federalism).144
Importantly, however, the Conservation Act has implications for both sides of
the “national constitutional primacy” coin—though the Australian national
government maintains constitutional primacy in the presence of an international
treaty, the Conservation Act also demonstrates the Commonwealth government’s
commitment to sharing constitutional forest policy authority (element 2). In other
words, the Australian national government has been quite vigorous in establishing
principles of cooperative federalism whereby it retains the authority to intervene in
state management of forests under its “external affairs” power, but leaves primary
forest governance in the hands of the subnational governments for political and
management reasons.
This approach is perhaps best evidenced by Australia’s 1992
Inter-Governmental Agreement on the Environment (Inter-Governmental
Agreement),145 which “sought to reduce intergovernmental conflict by committing
all governments to an agreement about their respective roles with respect to
environmental issues.”146 Under the Inter-Governmental Agreement, the
Commonwealth voluntarily limited its role in resource policy to specific
circumstances, including “[r]epresenting the national interest” 147 in circumstances

140. Id. at 145 (emphasis in original). Again, this is distinct from the United States,
where the federal government has never claimed, nor been judicially conferred, land use and
forest management regulatory authority.
141. Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, (Cth) (Austl.).
142. Kah Low & Sinniah Mahendrarajah, Future Directions for the Australian Forest
Industry,
ISSUES
INSIGHTS,
Mar.
2010,
at
13,
available
at
http://www.abare.gov.au/outlook/_download/a1.pdf.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Inter-governmental Agreement on the Environment, May 14, 1992 (Austl.).
146. Lane, supra note 125, at 145.
147. Id.
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“where the regional implications of proposals for the use of a resource transcend
State boundaries and affect two or more jurisdictions . . . where there are relevant
responsibilities under Commonwealth Acts of Parliament such as the Environment
Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act [of] 1974,” and “where, in the light of
scientific evidence, the Commonwealth has obligations under international
conventions.”148 The Inter-Governmental Agreement is a political concession rather
than a legal obligation, whereby the national government ceded part of its authority
to the states by placing self-imposed restrictions on its power to regulate the
environment.149 Though the government may have politically ceded this authority,
it did not do so constitutionally, as the High Court’s rulings in Tasmania and
related cases are dispositive on the question of constitutional authority. In other
words, “the Commonwealth has, regardless of its legal and constitutional powers
and capabilities, defined for itself a role narrower than its legal responsibilities,” 150
and has “generally approached its relationship with the states in a spirit of
cooperative federalism [and] self-imposed restraint in exercising its constitutional
powers.”151
Similar to the Inter-Governmental Agreement, the Commonwealth and the states
have entered into agreement on the 1992 National Forest Policy Statement (Forest
Statement),152 which established broad-based goals for Australia’s native forests,
including to “maintain an extensive and permanent native forest estate in Australia
and to manage that estate in an ecologically sustainable manner so as to conserve
the suite of values that forests can provide for current and future generations.” 153
The Forest Statement was also meant to establish a framework for cooperation
between the federal and state governments on forest management and was “devised
to give expression to the [Inter-Governmental Agreement] in terms of devolving
policy control for resource management issues to the states.” 154 The Forest
Statement establishes that,
State and Territory governments have primary responsibility for forest
management, in recognition of the constitutional responsibility of the
States for land use decisions and their ownership of large areas of

148. NATIONAL FOREST POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 122, at 19–20.
149. The Commonwealth’s role in resource management is “restricted” to “[r]epresenting
the national interest . . . [e]nsuring Australia’s international obligations are met . . .
[a]ssisting in the resolution of transboundary issues . . . [p]romoting co-operative approaches
to assessment and standard setting,” and “[c]oncern for its own environmental
responsibilities arising from Commonwealth actions and decisions.” Lane, supra note 125, at
145 (citation omitted).
150. Id.
151. Opeskin & Rothwell, supra note 123, at 2. Some have argued that this has “bound
the Commonwealth politically, if not legally, to consensus-based outcomes.” PHILLIP TOYNE,
THE RELUCTANT NATION: ENVIRONMENT, LAW AND POLITICS IN AUSTRALIA 14 (1994). For a
criticism of this approach, see Gary Musselwhite & Gamini Herath, Australia’s Regional
Forest Agreement Process: Analysis of the Potential and Problems, 7 FOREST POL’Y &
ECON. 579, 580 (2005).
152. NATIONAL FOREST POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 122.
153. Id. at 4.
154. Lane, supra note 125, at 146 (citation omitted).
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forest. The States and Territories have enacted legislation that allocates
forest land tenures and specifies the administrative framework and
policies within which public and private forests are managed. Local
governments have responsibilities for local land use planning and rating
systems, which affect public and private forest management and use. 155
Under the Forest Statement, the national government, while maintaining no explicit
constitutional authority over forest policy except that relating to nationally owned
forests, is primarily responsible for “coordinating a national approach to both
environmental and industry-development issues . . . including a national approach
to forest issues”156—a recognition of the Commonwealth’s implicit constitutional
authority to order its international obligations under its “external affairs” power.
Other examples of the Commonwealth’s sharing of national constitutional
primacy are the Regional Forest Agreements (RFAs) negotiated between the
national and state governments. RFAs constitute an attempt to navigate the politics
of the national government having potentially unfettered regulatory authority over
environmental resources and private property rights under its “external affairs”
power. RFAs are twenty-year plans meant to guide the management of forests, to
establish “long-term, durable agreement on the use of forests in order to provide
industry with access to forest resources while protecting the environmental and
cultural values of forest areas,”157 and to “mediat[e] the tension between different
levels of Government.”158 Because “Commonwealth governments of all political
persuasions have felt the electoral and policy impact of conflict with the states on
environmental matters . . . [t]he RFA process [provides] a means of establishing a
long-term resolution to questions of forest allocation and use in a way that reasserts
the primacy of the states in forest management.” 159
RFAs effectively constitute a political maneuver on behalf of the national
government as a means of navigating “forest politics” in Australia by establishing
shared authority with subnational governments in the area of forest management.
Indeed, “[t]he political purpose of the RFA process . . . was to take forest issues off
the political agenda by securing Commonwealth and State cooperation.”160 As a
result, RFAs also encapsulate both national constitutional primacy and national
sharing of forest authority. With regard to primacy, RFAs allow the
Commonwealth to directly participate in forest planning to take into account
biodiversity, water production, wood production, and social and economic values.
As a result, “the long-standing argument that forestry is a State responsibility under
the Constitution has been superseded by these arrangements.”161 Yet RFAs also
represent a voluntary ceding of regulatory authority from the national government

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

NATIONAL FOREST POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 122, at 1.
Id.
Lane, supra note 125, at 143.
Lane, supra note 96, at 288.
Lane, supra note 125, at 151.
Musselwhite & Herath, supra note 151, at 581 (citation omitted).
Ferguson, supra note 131, at 140.
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to the states, given that “RFAs have surrendered much of the [forest regulatory]
powers to the states.”162
In sum, the Australian model of federalism, specifically in the context of climate
change and forests, may be summarized as follows:
One response during the past ten years to the expanded scope of the
Commonwealth Parliament’s power over external affairs has been to
adopt a more cooperative approach to federalism in Australia. Through
this process, the states have had a greater policy input into decisions
concerning Australia’s treaty relations, and an expanded role in the
domestic implementation and enforcement of the obligations imposed
by those treaties. This approach has generally been a successful one
provided there has been a clear division of responsibility between
Commonwealth and states over the relevant subject matter and the
Commonwealth has been able to gain the cooperation of the states in
creating a cooperative legislative scheme. 163
Ultimately, Australia maintains all three elements conducive to maximizing
flexibility in international negotiations among federal systems of government,
while also retaining the benefits of decentralized forest governance. National
constitutional primacy allows the Australian national government to enter into an
international treaty on climate and forests unconstrained and to act as a fail-safe in
the absence of sound subnational forest policy. National sharing of constitutional
authority facilitates mechanisms that allow subnational governments to both
successfully implement the treaty and perform their functional role within a federal
system to achieve the benefits of decentralized forest management. Institutional
enforcement capacity in Australia allows the treaty and implementing legislation to
be enforced.164

162. Musselwhite & Herath, supra note 151, at 585 (citation omitted).
163. Opeskin & Rothwell, supra note 123, at 56 57. Even so, this approach has not been
without its complications, as scholars note that this cooperative approach has caused delays
in fulfilling international obligations, a lack of uniformity in implementing laws, and legal
issues arising out of coordination between the federal and state governments and by the fact
that a state has the potential to place the federal government in breach of its international
duties. Id. at 57.
164. The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index rates Australia ninth out of sixty-six
countries studied for the absence of corruption, and eighth out of sixty-six for regulatory
enforcement. MARK D. AGRAST, JUAN C. BOTERO & ALEJANDRO PONCE, THE WORLD JUSTICE
PROJECT, THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX 2011 [hereinafter WORLD
JUSTICE
PROJECT],
available
at
http://worldjusticeproject.org/
sites/default/files/wjproli2011_0.pdf. Australia also has a positive score on the
Environmental Regulatory Regimes Index developed by Yale and Columbia Universities,
which “integrates assessment of the stringency of environmental pollution standards, the
extent of subsidization of natural resources, the strictness of enforcement and the quality of
environmental institutions.” MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 43.
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2. Public/Private Forest Ownership
Approximately 74% of Australian forests are publicly owned and 26% are
privately owned.165 As noted, Australian state and territory governments have
primary responsibility for regulating both public and private forests, though both
are also subject to federal regulation under the Commonwealth’s “external affairs”
power in the presence of an international treaty. Since the “external affairs” power
received expanded interpretation in Tasmania, the national government has taken
an even greater role in private forest management. The Forest Statement includes as
one of its goals the sustainable management of privately owned forests, which is to
be undertaken “through a combination of measures that may include dissemination
of information about and technical support for forest management, education
programs, conservation incentives, land-clearing controls, harvesting controls, and
codes of forest practice.”166
Due to the high proportion of publicly owned forests, “[f]orest and timber
resources on private lands . . . have largely escaped public scrutiny and regulation”
and “[t]he practice and profession of forestry is primarily focused on public
lands.”167 Even so, due to both the high proportion of public forest ownership, and
the fact that both public and private forests are subject to Commonwealth exercises
of its “external affairs” power, the Australian national government maintains the
constitutional capacity to prevent its limited private ownership of forests from
derailing its involvement in international negotiations on forests—in stark contrast
to the United States, where the treaty power may not trump subnational regulatory
control over the 60% of forests in private ownership. What this ultimately means is
that the division of forest ownership between private and public entities does not
legally impact the ability of the national government to agree to and implement a
climate treaty, because it is not legally constrained by either subnational units of
government or private property interests in the exercise of its “external affairs”
power.
B. Brazil
1. Constitutional Primacy, National Sharing, and Institutional Enforcement
Prior to the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, which aimed to decentralize forest
management, Brazilian forest policy at all levels was administered exclusively by
the national government.168 The national government exercised this authority under
the first major forest law in Brazil, the Forest Code of 1965, 169 which provided the

165. Low & Mahendrarajah, supra note 142, at 5.
166. NATIONAL FOREST POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 122, at 11.
167. Lane, supra note 96, at 287. Despite the high proportion of public ownership, 44%
of public forestland is privately managed, placing the percentage of privately managed land
in Australia at approximately 70%. Low & Mahendrarajah, supra note 142, at 5.
168. SOFIA R. HIRAKURI, CAN LAW SAVE THE FOREST?: LESSONS FROM FINLAND AND
BRAZIL
19
(2003),
available
at
http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/
publications/
pdf_files/Books/Law.pdf.
169. Lei No. 4.771, de 15 de setembro de 1965, CODIGO FLORESTAL [C. FLOR.] [Forestry
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general framework for forest laws, established protected forest areas and the
process for designating them, and put into place “detailed forest practice guidelines
for protected areas and reserves on all forestland in the country.” 170 The
constitutional authority for managing forests, however, was reallocated in 1988
with the establishment of a new Brazilian constitution.
Unlike the U.S. and Australian constitutions, the Brazilian Constitution contains
explicit forestry provisions. Article 225 states that the Brazilian forests are “part of
the national patrimony, and they shall be used, as provided by law, under
conditions which ensure the preservation of the environment.” 171 Article 23
declares that the national, state, and local governments have the power to “preserve
the forests,” while Article 24 establishes that they may do so with concurrent
legislative competence in the area of forest management. Regarding concurrent
legislation, Article 24 supposedly limits the national government’s role to the
“establishment of general principles,” and preserves the “supplementary
competence of the states” to legislate. 172 Article 24 declares, however, that “[t]he
supervenience of a federal law over general rules suspends the effectiveness of a
state law to the extent that the two are contrary.” 173
The “supervenience” element of the Brazilian Constitution has proven crucial to
defining the true division of forest regulatory authority between the Brazilian
national and subnational governments. Scholars interpret the “concurrent
legislation” clause in Article 23 to mean that “the federal government has absolute
power (plenary power) to establish laws and regulations, and the states and
municipalities have only limited power.”174 Indeed, forest policy in Brazil might be
characterized as completely “supervened” by the national government. The primary
national agency responsible for implementing and enforcing forest laws, the
Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources
(IBAMA), is said to have adopted the pre-1988 Constitution “centralized
administration model” of governance, despite the fact that the 1988 Constitution
Code], D.O.U. de 28.09.65 (Braz.), reprinted in 5 COLEÇAO DAS LEIS 157 (1965), amended
by Provisional Measure N° 1.511 of 25 July 1996.
170. Simone Bauch, Erin Sills, Luiz Carlos Estraviz Rodriguez, Kathleen McGinley &
Frederick Cubbage, Forest Policy Reform in Brazil, 107 J. FORESTRY 132, 134 (2009)
(citation
omitted),
available
at
http://www.fs.fed.us/
global/iitf/pubs/ja_iitf_
2009_bauch001.pdf.
171. Article 225 begins by stating: “All have the right to an ecologically balanced
environment, which is an asset of common use and essential to a healthy quality of life, and
both the Government and the community shall have the duty to defend and preserve it for
present and future generations.” CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225
(Braz.).
172. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 24 (Braz.).
173. Id.
174. Janelle E. Kellman, The Brazilian Legal Tradition and Environmental Protection:
Friend or Foe, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 145, 153 (2002). Provisional Measure
No. 1511 of July 1996, which was meant to increase forest reserves as well as restrict
clear-cutting, is one such example. Provisional Measure N° 1.511 of 25 July 1996. The
federal government actually establishes, through the forest code, that clear-cutting is
restricted to 20 to 80% of a parcel of land. HIRAKURI, supra note 168, at 21. This is very
different from the United States, where such regulations are currently the role of state
governments.
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was designed to facilitate general decentralization of governance.175 IBAMA had
traditionally regulated all public and private lands, and though new laws have
sought to transfer some of that authority to subnational governments, 176 IBAMA
still retains superseding authority over forest resources. 177 In fact, state and local
governments have largely “taken very little or no responsibility for the
implementation of forest policy, including enforcement.” 178
Due in part to general principles of constitutional interpretation by the Brazilian
judiciary, the 1988 Constitution’s legal framework for transitioning to a more
decentralized form of forest management has not been very successful. The
Brazilian high court, the Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supremo Tribunal), has
affirmed Brazil’s commitment to a more centralized form of federalism than that
present in the United States. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the Supremo Tribunal
has never invalidated federal legislation for intruding into traditional “reserved”
powers of the states, nor has the Supremo Tribunal debated whether its decisions
should be governed by federal or state law.179 The Supremo Tribunal’s more
centralized view of federalism results from the fact that “Brazilian Constitutions
have granted far greater powers to the federal government than the U.S.
Constitution.”180 As a result, Supremo Tribunal justices have never “assumed the
role of protecting states’ rights from infringement by the federal legislation.” 181
Ultimately, even though there is constitutional concurrence between the national
and subnational governments for forest legislation in Brazil—establishing the legal
framework for decentralized forest governance—the national government’s power
to “supervene” subnational authority gives it national constitutional primacy
(element 1) over forest management. Recently, however, the Brazilian government
has attempted to remedy the problem of subnational governments not capitalizing
on their constitutional authority to establish forest policy. New laws aim to transfer
the approval and enforcement of forest management plans to state environmental
agencies, and both the national and state governments have shown an increased
focus on greater subnational involvement in forest regulation. 182 Given explicit
constitutional concurrence over forest policy, and an increased focus on
decentralized forest governance, Brazil does maintain a national sharing of
constitutional forest policy authority (element 2)—though it has proven slow to
come to fruition and the national government “retains much of its traditional
command and controls regulatory powers.”183

175. HIRAKURI, supra note 168, at 19.
176. See Bauch et al., supra note 170, at 135. For example, IBAMA previously required
all forest owners to have an approved forest management plan (Plande Manejo Florestal
Sustentavel [PMFS]) before harvesting timber, and all harvested timber was required to have
a transport authorization to demonstrate that it came from an area with an approved forest
management plan. Id.
177. See HIRAKURI, supra note 168, at 20.
178. Id. (citation omitted).
179. Keith S. Rosenn, Federalism in Brazil, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 577, 584 85 (2005).
180. Id. at 585.
181. Id.
182. GREGERSEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 33; Bauch et al., supra note 170, at 135.
183. Bauch et al., supra note 170, at 135.
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Despite a high concentration of national government legal authority over forests
and the fact that Brazil has some of the most complex forestry laws in the world,
Brazil’s forest management constitutional provisions have been largely
ineffective.184 Thus, even though Brazil maintains the first two elements facilitating
flexibility in global climate negotiations related to forests, lack of institutional
enforcement capacity (element 3) has severely impeded actual implementation of
environmental constitutional provisions and legislation in Brazil.185 Scholars argue
that “[t]he ineffectiveness of laws alone to protect the environment is nowhere as
evident as in the contemporary destruction of the Amazonian . . . forests,” 186 and
that “[a]ttempts to embody environmental protection clauses in national
constitutions, such as Brazil’s, do not appear to have appreciably influenced the
prevailing bureaucratic culture.”187 Article 26 of the Brazilian Constitution actually
makes destruction of the Amazonian and Atlantic forests a crime under the penal
code,188 but rarely has this constitutional provision been enforced.189 The Brazilian
government’s own reports demonstrate that “the federal government has failed to
enforce forestry regulations in relation to forest management, indicating widespread
failure to implement forestry laws.” 190 In 1996, Brazilian government audits found
the compliance rate with forest laws to be just 30%, and that “even among the 30%
of projects which appeared to fully comply with forest management laws, the
management plans were not designed as a tool to produce sustainable timber, but
rather as a means to satisfy legal requirements to procure logging permits.” 191
The lack of enforcement results largely from prosecutorial inaction, a
conservative judicial system, public apathy, general corruption, deficient legal
structures, severe budgetary constraints on local governments, 192 faulty land
ownership structures, mistrust of government, 193 and other institutional problems. 194

184. Id. at 134.
185. See Kellman, supra note 174, at 159. The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index
rates Brazil twenty-fourth out of sixty-six countries studied for the absence of corruption,
and twenty-seventh out of sixty-six for regulatory enforcement. See WORLD JUSTICE
PROJECT, supra note 164, at 47. Brazil also has a negative score on the Environmental
Regulatory Regimes Index developed by Yale and Columbia Universities. MCDERMOTT ET
AL., supra note 10, at 43.
186. Emilio F. Moran, The Law, Politics, and Economics of Amazonian Deforestation, 1
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 397, 397 (1994).
187. Benjamin J. Richardson, Environmental Law in Postcolonial Societies: Straddling
the Local-Global Institutional Spectrum, 11 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 26 (2000).
188. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 26 (Braz.).
189. Moran, supra note 186, at 401.
190. HIRAKURI, supra note 168, at 2.
191. Id. at 78 (citation omitted).
192. It has been argued that “the Brazilian Constitution ha[s] affirmed the rights of all
their citizens to a healthy, stable environment. But these are constitutional provisions
disassociated from the funding required for their implementation and can be interpreted as
efforts to satisfy international pressure without requiring any practical steps to bring them
into action.” Moran, supra note 186, at 406.
193. HIRAKURI, supra note 168, at 51.
194. Id. at 29, 56; Kellman, supra note 174, at 159 60; Moran, supra note 186, at 401.
Scholars have noted that
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Thus, in Brazil, even in the presence of explicit forest-protection mandates in the
national constitution, the national government is unable to enforce legislation under
its broad powers. Without a strong judiciary, financial resources, a culture of
enforcement and overall political will, the central government is impeded from
guiding forest policy through international mechanisms—though it certainly
maintains the constitutional authority to do so. Indeed, “Brazilian environmental
agencies, while varying widely in their capacities, have not lived up to the promise
of Brazilian environmental law. . . . The result is a profound disconnect between
environmental law ‘on the books’ and environmental law as it operates in
practice.”195 Others assert that “[o]n paper, constitutional rights are better protected
in Brazil than in virtually any other country,” 196 but that “[t]he problem is in the

[e]nvironmentalists had hoped that the Constitution would mark a great
advance for environmental protection in Brazil by making environmental
concerns a national priority, at least on paper. The Brazilian Constitution
attempts to provide a comprehensive approach to environmental protection.
Perhaps most importantly, at least rhetorically, is its guarantee of a healthy and
stable environment to all Brazilian citizens. The truth, however, is that the
‘promise of the amendments’ contained in the Constitution has been ‘illusory.’
Kellman, supra note 174, at 152 (citing Armin Rosenkranz et al., Rio Plus Five:
Environmental Protection and Free Trade in Latin America, 9 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
527, 567 (1997)). A report issued by the Brazilian Institute of Agriculture Research
demonstrated that the federal government has failed to enforce forest management
regulations, and has thus failed to implement forestry laws. HIRAKURI, supra note 168, at 2.
The federal government itself, in 1996, recognized that it had not adequately implemented
forest management laws. Id. at 29. Government audits in Brazil in 1996 found the
compliance rate with forest laws to be just 30%. Id. at 78. Compare this with a 96% rate of
compliance among Finnish timber interests in 1997. Id. Some scholars believe that the lack
of enforcement is caused “more by lack of human and financial resources and institutional
capacity than by lack of adequate legislation.” Lila Katz de Barrera-Hernandez & Alastair R.
Lucas, Environmental Law in Latin America and the Caribbean: Overview and Assessment,
12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 231 (1999). It has also been noted that in Brazil, “it is
implementation, rather than policy, that is the problem. . . . [L]ow compliance with existing
forest management laws, rather than lack of laws, is often a leading cause of unsustainable
forestry practices.” HIRAKURI, supra note 168, at 2. Yet other scholars have argued that
“Brazilian environmental agencies tend to be among the least powerful agencies in the
government. They have difficulty defending policies and administrative actions that run
contrary to the priorities of political leaders and other governmental agencies.” LESLEY K.
MCALLISTER, MAKING LAW MATTER: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS IN BRAZIL 41 (2008).
195. MCALLISTER, supra note 194, at 55 56. As a further example, scholars have noted
that Provisional Measure No. 1511, passed in July 1996 in order to increase forest reserves
and restrict clear-cutting, “impose[s] stricter requirements on paper, [but] are not routinely
enforced and represent merely temporary measures rather than long-standing environmental
change.” Kellman, supra note 174, at 156. For further discussion on how judicial
deficiencies, lack of education and training for the citizenry, financial, and other societal
constraints hamstring enforcement of environmental laws in Brazil, see id. at 160 64.
196. Keith S. Rosenn, Judicial Review in Brazil: Developments Under the 1988
Constitution, 7 SW J. L. & TRADE AM. 291, 318 (2000).
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disturbing distance that separates the rights inscribed on paper from their effective
exercise, and above all in the guaranty of their exercise in practical life.” 197
Though Brazil retains two key elements conducive to balancing global forest
governance with federal decentralized domestic forest policy—national
constitutional primacy and national sharing of constitutional authority—lack of
institutional enforcement capacity prevents Brazil from being fully capable of
effective forest policy at either end of the local-global forest governance spectrum.
As noted by one scholar, “[t]he case of Brazil . . . highlights the difficulty in
designing internationally-binding legal instruments to promote sustainable uses of
the earth’s resources, and effective enforcement of regulations.” 198
2. Public/Private Forest Ownership
Roughly 25% of Brazil’s forests are in public ownership. The remaining 75%
are privately owned, or otherwise “unallocated.”199 Article 44 of the Forest Code of
the Unified Environmental Law in Brazil requires public and private property
owners to leave intact 80% of Amazonian rainforest areas. 200 These efforts,
however, have been largely unsuccessful at addressing private forest destruction.
Though the national government has the constitutional authority to avoid the issues
faced by the United States in implementing federal policy on private and
state-owned lands, entrenched and “archaic” views of private property rights in
Brazil still affect the ability of the national government to enforce forest regulation.
As noted by one scholar,
[i]ntervention of public authorities in what goes on inside a legally
titled property is opposed by the elites who control very large
properties, and by others who aspire to someday have them. Even
though the Constitution links the right to private property to its ‘social
function,’ this linkage has remained vague in legal terms and unapplied
to destruction of vast areas within the private domain of individuals or
corporations.201
Thus, the high proportion of private forest ownership, as in the United States,
affects implementation of forest policy at the national level—it does so, however,
due to lack of enforcement, not due to lack of recognized constitutional authority as
in the United States. Ultimately, because the national government in Brazil
maintains the constitutional authority to regulate both private and public forests, the
division of forest ownership between private and public entities does not legally
constrain the national government in international climate negotiations.

197. Id. at 318 (citing Carta ao Leitor, VEJA, Feb. 1989, at 23 (original in Portuguese)).
198. Moran, supra note 186, at 406.
199. HIRAKURI, supra note 168, at 54.
200. Lei N° 4.771, art. 44, de 15 de setembro de 1965, CÓDIGO FLORESTAL [C. FLOR.]
[Forestry Code], D.O.U. de 28.09.65 (Braz.), reprinted in 5 COLEÇÃO DAS LEIS 157 (1965),
amended by Provisional Measure N° 1.511 of 25 July 1996. This is an increase from the
50% required in the original 1965 Forest Code. HIRAKURI, supra note 168, at 11.
201. Moran, supra note 186, at 401.
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C. Canada
1. Constitutional Primacy, National Sharing, and Institutional Enforcement
Like the Brazilian Constitution—and unlike the U.S. and Australian
Constitutions—the Canadian Constitution Act of 1867 explicitly addresses forest
management. Section 92A designates that the exclusive responsibility for
nonfederally owned forest legislation, regulation, conservation, and overall
management lies with the provincial governments. This explicit grant of authority
to subnational governments has significant implications for Canada’s ability to
negotiate any climate treaty prescribing forest management standards, since 84% of
forests are nonfederally owned.202 In addition, the Canadian Constitution, unlike
other federal systems here discussed, does not allow concurrent jurisdiction over
forests and declares powers either exclusively federal or exclusively provincial. 203
Section 92(13) of the Constitution Act of 1982 reinforces provincial authority over
subnational forest management by giving provinces exclusive control over property
rights,204 which Canadian courts have construed broadly to include land use and
natural resources management.205 The 1982 amendments to Canada’s constitution
place it “beyond dispute that the provinces are primarily responsible for forest
management.”206 The result of these explicit constitutional provisions is that
Canadian forest policy is “extremely decentralized,” with national authority over
forests being “particularly weak.”207 The national government itself has even stated
that “[f]orest management is a matter of provincial jurisdiction. Each province and
territory has its own set of legislation, policies and regulations to govern the
management of its forests.”208 As a result, the Canadian national government has
refused to apply national environmental laws and forest policies or international
forest management agreements to the provinces.209

202. See CANADIAN COUNSEL OF FOREST MINISTERS, SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT
CANADA 4 (2010), available at http://www.sfmcanada.org/english/pdf/SFMBooklet_E_
US.pdf.
203. Paul Stanton Kibel, Canada’s International Forest Protection Obligations: A Case
of Promises Forgotten in British Columbia and Alberta, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 231, 247
(1995).
204. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 92(13)
(U.K.).
205. Kibel, supra note 203, at 246.
206. DAVID R. BOYD, UNNATURAL LAW: RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND POLICY 133 (2003). It should be noted, however, that under the Canadian constitution,
the federal government does retain the role of participating in international negotiations
“related to the conservation and use of forests.” Id. at 132.
207. Michael Howlett & Jeremy Rayner, Globalization and Governance Capacity:
Explaining Divergence in National Forest Programs as Instances of “Next-Generation”
Regulation in Canada and Europe, 19 GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. POL’Y, ADMIN. & INSTS. 251,
265 (2006).
208. Kibel, supra note 203, at 246 (citing CANADIAN FOREST SERV., THE STATE OF
CANADA’S FORESTS 1993, at 8 (1994)).
209. Id.
IN
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Section 91 of the Constitution, on the other hand, grants the national
government exclusive authority over trade and commerce and over “peace, order
and good government,” which the Canadian Supreme Court construes as including
implementation of treaties concerning trade and commerce and other matters of
“national concern.”210 Though the national government could perhaps attempt to
invoke this constitutional power to justify implementation of international climate
and forest agreements, “[t]he Canadian federal government has so far adopted the
position that, under the Canadian Constitution, its hands are tied.”211 Indeed, the
nearly exclusive control over forest management by the provinces has in the past
contributed to Canada’s lack of formal participation in international agreements 212
and has resulted in “constant tensions between the provinces and the federal
government over sharing of power” over forests. 213 In other areas of resource
management, such as fisheries and agriculture, the federal and provincial
governments have resolved management conflicts with a type of “cooperative
federalism,” which, though not involving a “national sharing of constitutional
authority” per se (element 2), involved political and fiscal pressures on the part of
the national government to achieve provincial compliance with national policy214—
an approach that might better be called “uncooperative federalism.” However, this
approach has yet to manifest regarding forests, almost certainly due to the explicit
constitutional provisions vesting exclusive forest management authority in the
provinces. Consequently, though scholars have argued that the potential exists for
greater federal involvement in forest policy, the Canadian national government, like
the U.S. national government, has refused to attempt to extend its authority to
non-federal forests.215
This lack of national constitutional primacy (element 1) negatively affects the
interplay between Canadian federalism and international agreements concerning
forests, and the Canadian national government is restrained by
provincially-reserved powers in the exercise of its treaty power. 216 In other words,
“in Canada, the federal government lacks legislative competence to implement
treaties whose subject matter falls within provincial jurisdiction” 217—a scenario
similar to the situation in the United States, if not more intractable. In the United
States, though Missouri v. Holland was certainly narrow,218 the Supreme Court did
not give such definitive treatment to the question of whether federalism principles

210. Id. at 248 (citations omitted).
211. Id.
212. Howlett & Rayner, supra note 207, at 268.
213. GREGERSEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 37.
214. Kibel, supra note 203, at 250.
215. See id. at 249.
216. See Bradley, supra note 7, at 456.
217. Jeffrey L. Friesen, Note, The Distribution of Treaty-Implementing Powers in
Constitutional Federations: Thoughts on the American and Canadian Models, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1415, 1416 (1994). This state of affairs arises from the Labor Conventions case, where
the privy council established that the Canadian federal government may not implement
treaties via implementing legislation that intrudes into matters constitutionally reserved to
the provinces. 1937 App. Cas. 326 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Canada).
218. See supra notes 85–90.
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constrain the treaty power. Furthermore, the situation in Canada presents the polar
opposite scenario to that in Australia, where courts have interpreted the
Commonwealth government’s “external affairs” power quite broadly. After
combining the explicit constitutional grant of regulatory authority over forests to
the provinces with the fact that the Canadian treaty power is definitively restricted
by reserved provincial powers, it becomes clear that Canada is currently even more
restricted in international negotiations regarding forests than is the United States.
Indeed, “[w]hile the United States Constitution actually contemplates a system that
values the importance of the nation’s being able to implement its treaties, the
Canadian constitutional framework appears to subordinate international concerns to
domestic separation of legislative competence.”219 Furthermore, and again unlike
U.S. courts, “Canadian courts have consistently extended rather than diminished
provincial power.”220
Thus, the Canadian national government, though maintaining institutional
enforcement capacity (element 3) as a general matter, 221 currently has neither
constitutional primacy over forest management (element 1) nor any resulting
national sharing of constitutional forest authority (element 2).
2. Public/Private Forest Ownership
Ninety-three percent of Canada’s forests are publicly owned, with provincial
governments responsible for regulating both the 7% of privately owned forests and
the 77% of forests in provincial ownership.222 As a result, the national government
only maintains constitutional authority to regulate the 16% of public forests in
national ownership.223 Because the provinces are in charge of regulating both
private and public forests, 224 as in the United States, forest ownership may affect
the shape of an international climate treaty that includes forests. In Canada,
however, it is subnational public ownership rather than private ownership that
constrains the Canadian national government in treaty negotiations. Subnational
constitutional primacy over forests combined with the vast provincial ownership of
forests likely means the national government would be legally prohibited from
implementing certain potential international forest management obligations on a
vast majority of forests within its borders.

219. Friesen, supra note 217, at 1433.
220. Id. at 1439 (also noting that “proposed constitutional amendments, particularly since
1982, have uniformly sought to vest more power in the provinces at the expense of the
central government”).
221. The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index rates Canada eleventh out of sixty-six
countries studied for the absence of corruption and thirteenth out of sixty-six for regulatory
enforcement. WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 164, at 51. Canada also has a positive
score on the Environmental Regulatory Regimes Index developed by Yale and Columbia
Universities. MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 43.
222. CANADIAN COUNSEL OF FOREST MINISTERS, supra note 202, at 4–5.
223. Id. at 4.
224. Id. at 5.
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D. India
1. Constitutional Primacy, National Sharing, and Institutional Enforcement
Like the Canadian and Brazilian Constitutions, the Indian Constitution explicitly
addresses forest protection, with Article 48A declaring that the government “shall
endeavor to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and
wildlife of the country.”225 Article 51-A(g) states that “[i]t shall be the duty of
every citizen of India to protect and improve the natural environment including
forests . . . .”226 The central government’s role over forests has increased over time,
and in 1972 the 42nd amendment to the Constitution granted concurrent oversight
over forests to the national and state governments, further “empowering the central
government to have decisive decision-making authority over management of the
nation’s forests.”227 In the event that national and state legislation clash, as in
Brazil, “the Union enjoys a primacy over States in that its legislation in the Union
and the Concurrent List prevails over State legislations.” 228 The Union capitalized
on this recentralization of forest authority by passing the Forest Conservation Act
of 1980,229 which further “increased centralized control by making it mandatory to
obtain permission from the central government for converting forest land to
non-forest uses.”230 Indeed, the National Forest Policy of 1988231 “is driven by
top-down targets, with the national government setting clear objectives” with the
goal of achieving forest cover on one-third of the total land area.232 Thus, it is clear
that in India the national government has constitutional primacy over forests
(element 1) to act as a fail-safe for forest management.
Despite this strong national constitutional authority, however, India’s
constitution also incorporates a decentralized approach to forest management—at
least on paper—granting a great degree of regulatory authority to its thirty-five
state governments. Like Australia, India’s governance structure can thus be
characterized as the national government purposefully ceding authority via
decentralization as a policy choice for improved forest management—thus
establishing a framework for national sharing of constitutional forest policy
authority (element 2). In fact, India has actually taken its national sharing of

225. INDIA CONST. art. 48A.
226. INDIA CONST. art. 51A(g).
227. GREGERSEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 55. Article 246 of the Indian Constitution
grants concurrent oversight over items listed in “List III” of the Indian Constitution,
including forests. INDIA CONST. art. 246(2).
228. SJVN LTD., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN INDIA § 1.2,
available at www.sjvn.nic.in/projects/environmental-regulations.pdf.
229. Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, no. 69, Acts of Parliament, 1980 (India).
230. GREGERSEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 55; see MINISTRY OF ENV’T & FORESTS,
NATIONAL FOREST POLICY
RESOLUTION
§
4.3.2
(1988),
available
at
http://envfor.nic.in/divisions/fp/nfp.htm (India).
231. MINISTRY OF ENV’T & FORESTS, supra note 230.
232. Alon Tal & Jessica A. Cohen, Bringing “Top-Down” to “Bottom-Up”: A New Role
for Environmental Legislation in Combating Desertification, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 163,
203 04 (2007).
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constitutional forest authority further than simply decentralizing to the state
government level. The 73rd and 74th amendments to the constitution require states
to decentralize forest regulatory authority to even lower levels of government—
local governmental units known as “panchayats.”233 The national fail-safe authority
operates concurrently with this local authority, as federal agencies continue to
mandate policy at the subnational level in areas such as forest fire control and
long-term forest management planning.234
Ultimately, India’s constitutional structure establishes both national
constitutional primacy (element 1) and national sharing of constitutional forest
policy authority (element 2). The effects of these elements are evident specifically
in the context of international treaty making. International agreements have had a
direct impact on the forest sector planning process in India—again, at least on
paper—signifying that national government adoption of international protocols is
not hampered by subnational government interference.235
Like Brazil, however, India is missing the key element of institutional
enforcement capacity (element 3). Enforcement capabilities are hampered by the
budgetary constraints of a developing country and “[i]nadequate resources
seriously constrain the implementation of the National Forest Policy.” 236 India also
ranks low on rule of law and environmental regulatory regime indices, as it
struggles with corruption and lack of enforcement. 237 So even though India has a
“well-articulated forest policy, its translation into a feasible strategy has been
slow.”238 As a result, “[i]nstitutional reform in forestry needs to be pursued with
great vigour.”239
2. Public/Private Forest Ownership
Ninety-seven percent of all forests in India are publicly owned, and roughly
85% of forests are managed by the state governments. 240 Government forests “are
managed either directly by state institutions or granted in usufruct to private entities
or to communities under a variety of arrangements.” 241 Ultimately, due to the high
proportion of publicly owned forests and the national government’s constitutional

233. GREGERSEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 54. In fact, the greater tension in Indian forest
regulatory authority seems to be between the state and local governments, rather than
between the state and federal governments. See id. at 57.
234. INDIAN INST. OF FOREST MGMT., NATIONAL FOREST POLICY REVIEW 120 (2010),
available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/AC921E/AC921E04.pdf.
235. Id. at 115.
236. Id. at 128.
237. The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index rates India thirty-ninth out of sixty-six
countries studied for the absence of corruption, and fifty-second out of sixty-six for
regulatory enforcement. WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 164, at 66. India also has a
negative score on the Environmental Regulatory Regimes Index developed by Yale and
Columbia Universities. MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 43.
238. INDIAN INST. OF FOREST MGMT., supra note 234, at 129.
239. Id. at 113.
240. GREGERSEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 54.
241. Id.
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authority to direct management on state-owned forests, the public/private forest
ownership divide does not limit India’s options in entering into and implementing
an international treaty that includes forest management.
E. Russia
1. Constitutional Primacy, National Sharing, and Institutional Enforcement
Russia alone accounts for more than 25% of the standing forests worldwide. 242
The Russian Federation Constitution243 establishes a hierarchy of legal authorities,
with the constitution being the supreme legal authority. 244 Treaties to which the
Russian Federation agrees are incorporated into this supreme authority, as Article
15.4 of the constitution declares that “norms of international law and international
treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its
legal system. If an international treaty of the Russian Federation establishes other
rules than those stipulated by the law, the rules of the international treaty shall
apply.”245 So not only does the national government maintain broad authority to
negotiate and implement treaties, but treaties are also constitutionally declared to
trump domestic legislation in the event that the two conflict—setting a firm legal
foundation for an unconstrained national government in treaty negotiations. 246
The Russian Constitution establishes areas of sole national jurisdiction and areas
of joint jurisdiction between the national and subnational governments (known as
“subjects”).247 Article 72 declares that areas of concurrent jurisdiction include
“issues of possession, use and disposal of land, subsoil, water and other natural
resources . . . land, water, and forest legislation.” 248 The Russian Federation’s
stance on forest policy, however, is that though subject governments may have
their own forest legislation, it must not conflict with national forest legislation. 249
This policy, combined with the broad treaty power, clearly establishes national
constitutional primacy over forest management (element 1), especially in the
context of international agreements. Indeed, the Russian Constitution, distinct from

242. Natalia V. Malysheva, Main Features of Russia’s Forest Management System, in
THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, PEOPLE AND POWER, supra note 8, at 229,
230.
243. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] (Russ.).
244. MINNA PAPPILA, INT’L INST. FOR APP. SYS., IR-99-058, THE RUSSIAN FOREST SECTOR
AND LEGISLATION IN TRANSITION 2–3 (1999).
245. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 15.4
(Russ.) (emphasis added).
246. Gennady M. Danilenko, The New Russian Constitution and International Law, 88
AM. J. INT’L L. 451, 453, 465 66 (1994).
247. There are eighty-three subnational units of government in Russia, called “subjects.”
Migara O. De Silva, Galina Kurlyandskaya, Elena Andreeva & Natalia Golovanova,
Intergovernmental Reforms in the Russian Federation: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?,
THE
WORLD
BANK
(2009),
available
at
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2668/501730PUB0Inte1IC0di
sclosed0Aug0261.txt?sequence=2.
248. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 72 (Russ.).
249. PAPPILA, supra note 244, at 21.
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other constitutions here reviewed, “confirms the current trend in Russian practice of
giving a prominent place to international legal standards in the domestic legal
setting.”250
The primary forest legislation in Russia is the Russian Forest Code of 2007.251
The Code has been credited as a direct attempt by the national government to
decentralize Russian forest policy, demonstrating national sharing of constitutional
forest policy authority (element 2).252 Yet it is clear that the Code leaves in place
ultimate national control over both public and private forest regulation, as the
national government delegates some forest regulatory tasks to the subject
governments, but explicitly reserves for itself final authority over forest standard
setting.253 Article 83 of the Forest Code states that the “authorised federal executive
body shall have the right to issue enactments on exercising the powers delegated to
the public authorities of the Subjects of the Russian Federation, as well as
mandatory guidelines and instructions on exercising such powers by the executive
authorities of the Subjects of the Russian Federation.” 254 The national government
must approve the methods by which a subject utilizes delegated authority and must
also approve the appointment of subject executive heads exercising delegated
powers.255 The national government also oversees legislation passed by subject
governments pursuant to their delegated powers, retaining the right to “issue
mandatory prescriptions to invalidate enactments of Subjects of the Russian
Federation or to amend them,” and even maintains the power to “prepare proposals
on withdrawal of respective powers from the public authorities of the Subjects” and
to have those powers revoked.256 Areas of forest regulation that in the United States
are the role of state and local governments, such as zoning for forestry activities
and regulation of clear-cutting, are ultimately administered by federal agencies in
Russia.257 For example, the national government can go so far as to prohibit clearcutting altogether.258 Thus, governance of forests in Russia has been described as
remaining “de facto quite centralized”259 under its broad national constitutional
primacy (element 1), even though it has established the legal framework for
decentralized sharing of national constitutional authority (element 2).

250. Danilenko, supra note 246, at 464.
251. LESNOI KODEKS ROSSIIKOI FEDERATSII [LK RF] (Forestry Code) [hereinafter Forest
Code], available at http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/FOR/forest_cdrom/downloads/Forest_
code/ForestCode-3rdReading-061108-eng.pdf.
252. Contreras-Hermosilla, et al., supra note 115, at 10.
253. The federal government maintains primary regulatory authority for various forest
activities, such as restrictions on clear-cutting (Article 17), forest uses (Article 27),
reforestation (Article 62), development of forest management planning procedures (Article
67), and at least fifty other forest management activities (Articles 81 and 82). Forest Code,
supra note 251, art. 17, 27, 62, 67.
254. Id. at art. 83-8.
255. Id. at art. 83-9.
256. Id.
257. Id. at art. 15, 17.
258. Id. at art. 17-6.
259. CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA ET AL., supra note 17, at 3.
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Similar to Brazil and India, however, Russia lacks adequate institutional
enforcement capacity (element 3), inhibiting the national government’s ability to
utilize the great degree of legal authority it maintains over forest management. 260
This lack is because the “division of powers between the center and subjects is still
unclear . . . and administrative competencies are not well defined.” 261 Specifically
in the forest sector, an “[u]nclear hierarchy of laws, division of powers, and
contradicting laws affect the credibility” of forest legislation and further
complicates implementation of legislation. 262 Overlapping jurisdictions have led to
conflicts between national and subject governments, as some subjects “claim that
their own constitution is superior to the federal constitution” and that certain areas
constitutionally designated as joint jurisdiction are in fact areas of exclusive subject
jurisdiction, resulting in inconsistencies in local forest laws and national
legislation.263
Scholars have recognized that in countries where the central government owns
most forest resources, like Russia, central agency control and overall governance of
forests is weak, whereas governance is stronger in countries where subnational
governments own the resource, like Canada. 264 A causal link between which level
of government owns the resource and the quality of management is not necessary to
explain that descriptive result, however, as whether the national government
maintains institutional enforcement capacity regardless of ownership may be of
greater importance. Russia does not maintain such capacity, as its young federation
is still battling elements of corruption, unclear constitutional balance and separation
of powers, and a weak judiciary. 265 Indeed, the Forest Code of 2007 “appears to
undermine Russia’s capacity to realise its international legal commitments and

260. The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index rates Russia fifty-first out of sixty-six
countries studied for the absence of corruption and fiftieth out of sixty-six for regulatory
enforcement. WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 164, at 90. Russia also has a negative
score on the Environmental Regulatory Regimes Index developed by Yale and Columbia
Universities. See supra note 164.
261. PAPPILA, supra note 244, at 5. Also noting that “[t]here are doubts whether Russian
federalism really works” and “whether the law-making powers are really clear in Russia.” Id.
at 2.
262. Id. at 2.
263. Id. at 5. Scholars have noted that “[t]he federal government has no means of prior
surveillance of local legislation in order to avoid inconsistencies. The only way to control
that regional law does not contradict the Russian Constitution or federal laws is to appeal to
the Constitutional Court, which takes approximately five years.” Id. In addition, Article 78
of the constitution allows the federal executive branch to enter into administrative
agreements to transfer powers to subject executives, as long as the transfer does not conflict
with the Russian Constitution or federal laws. Though these agreements were intended to
make the division of powers between the federal and subject governments more clear,
scholars have suggested they have had the opposite effect and have blurred the mandates of
the constitution, as in some agreements the federal government has given powers granted to
it exclusively by the constitution to subject governments. Id. at 6.
264. GREGERSEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 6.
265. Again, these problems are a separate question from whether the central government
maintains an adequate constitutional framework, regardless of who controls the resource, to
implement important national legislation on forests.
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agreements” since it is “convoluted, vague and frequently in contradiction to the
sincere efforts by many to realise sustainable forest legal mechanisms for the 21st
century.”266 Ultimately, like Brazil and India, Russia maintains elements 1 and 2,
and therefore maintains much of what would otherwise provide a sufficient
constitutional framework for participating in international climate and forest
negotiations as well as retaining the benefits of decentralized forest governance.
Yet, lack of element 3 inhibits enforcement of the Russian Federation’s
constitutional authority.
2. Public/Private Forest Ownership
An overwhelming majority of Russian forests are owned by the national
government.267 Article 9 of the constitution gives the Russian Federation the power
to protect land and natural resources “as the basis of the life and activity of the
people living in corresponding territories.”268 Whereas the U.S. Supreme Court has
ruled that direct land use regulation is a “quintessential state and local power,” 269
Article 36 of the Russian Constitution explicitly grants land use regulatory
authority to the national government in the area of the environment, stating that
private property owners have the right to “possess, utilize, and dispose of land and
other natural resources provided that this does not damage the environment and
does not violate the rights and legitimate interests of others.”270
The current Russian Constitution no longer places restrictions on private
ownership of property, as it had done in the past, and Article 9 allows land and
other natural resources to be in private, state, municipal, and other forms of
ownership.271 Similarly, the 2007 Forest Code now allows for privatization of
forest resources.272 At the time of the 1997 Forest Code, private forest ownership
was actually illegal, as was subject regulation of private property owners’
management of forest resources.273 The privatization of other forms of property,
however, has occurred much more quickly than forest privatization, and though the
current forest code allows for privatization, the national government still controls
virtually all of the country’s forests. 274 Because the national government remains
both the primary owner of forests and the primary regulator of public and private
forest management, forest ownership distribution in Russia is not an impediment to
the Russian Federation’s ability to enter into and implement a climate treaty aimed
at forest management.

266. TAIGA RESCUE NETWORK, COMMENTS ON THE NEW RUSSIAN FOREST CODE 3 (2007),
available at http://www.taigarescue.org/_v3/files/pdf/201.pdf.
267. GREGERSEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 41.
268. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 9 (Russ.).
269. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006).
270. PAPPILA, supra note 244, at 7.
271. Id.
272. TAIGA RESCUE NETWORK, supra note 266, at 1.
273. See PAPPILA, supra note 244, at 8.
274. Id. at 7–8.
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V. SURVEY SUMMARY AND SITUATING FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS
WITHIN THE POLICY FORMULATION/IMPLEMENTATION MATRIX
The foregoing comparative constitutional analysis, as depicted in Chart 1 and
Figure 2 below, demonstrates that only Australia maintains all three elements
within its constitutional structure that most readily facilitate federal nation-state
agreement on the widest range of international negotiations on forests, successful
treaty implementation, and the preservation of decentralized forest policy-making
authority.
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Elements of Federal Constitutional Structure Most Conducive for
Balancing Global Forest Governance With Decentralized Policy-making
1) National
Constitutional
Primacy

2) National Sharing
of Constitutional
Authority

Australia

X

X

India

X

X

Brazil

X

X

Russia

X

X

3) Institutional
Enforcement
Capacity
X

Canada

X

United States

X

Australia maintains national constitutional primacy (element 1) over both
publicly and privately owned forests through its “external affairs” power, yet it
shares this authority with the states and territories, as evidenced by the
Inter-Governmental Agreement on the Environment, the National Forest Policy
Statement, and various Regional Forest Agreements, in order to achieve optimum
forest management on local scales (element 2). Australia also maintains sufficient
institutional enforcement capacity (element 3), since Australia is not plagued by
inadequate legal and enforcement institutions. The Australian national
government’s control over all subnationally owned forests via its “external affairs”
power means that the public/private forest ownership divide depicted in Figure 1
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does not operate as a significant legal obstacle for international climate and forest
negotiations.
Brazil, India, and Russia, meanwhile, maintain only two key elements. Brazil’s
constitution explicitly establishes national constitutional primacy (element 1) over
all subnational forest management through its provisions allowing the
“supervenience” of national laws over contrary state laws and the general
constitutional deference afforded the national government by Brazilian courts. New
laws aimed at transferring approval and enforcement of forest management plans to
state environmental agencies, increased focus on greater subnational involvement
in forest regulation at both the national and subnational levels, and explicit
constitutional concurrence over forest policy also demonstrate a framework of
national sharing of forest policy authority (element 2). Brazil, however, is missing
the crucial element of institutional enforcement capacity (element 3) because
prosecutorial apathy, a weak judiciary, general corruption, deficient legal
structures, severe budgetary constraints, and other institutional problems hamper
enforcement. In addition, the high proportion of private ownership of forests in
Brazil, as in the United States, affects implementation of forest policy at the
national level. This effect, however, is due solely to a lack of enforcement, rather
than a lack of national government legal authority over private lands, as is the case
in the United States. Thus, the constitutional framework is in place for the Brazilian
national government to prevent Brazil’s high degree of private forest ownership
from limiting the range of options in international climate and forest negotiations.
Amendments to the Indian Constitution allowing concurrent oversight over
forests and legislative acts passed pursuant to that authority—the Forest
Conservation Act of 1980 and the National Forest Policy of 1988—have resulted in
national constitutional primacy over forest management (element 1). India also has
robust national sharing of constitutional authority (element 2), as its constitution
mandates that regional (state) governments must decentralize forest policy making
to even lower levels of government. Even so, budgetary constraints, corruption, and
other regulatory enforcement issues cause a lack of institutional enforcement
capacity in India (element 3). Due to the high proportion of public ownership of
forests and the national government’s authority to direct management on state and
other subnationally owned forests, however, the public/private ownership divide
does not negatively affect India’s legal capacity to enter into and implement an
international climate treaty that includes direct forest management standards.
Russia also maintains national constitutional primacy (element 1), as subject
government legislation on forests must not conflict with national mandates, and the
Russian Federation has a sweeping treaty power. The Russian Forest Code of 2007
also encapsulates a national sharing of constitutional authority (element 2). Due to
a confusing hierarchy of laws, unclear division of powers, and contradictory
national and subnational laws, however, Russia lacks adequate institutional
enforcement capacity (element 3)—even though national ownership of an
overwhelming majority of the forests in Russia causes the public/private forest
ownership divide not to be an impediment to the Russian national government
during international negotiations.
Canada, like the United States, only maintains one key element: institutional
enforcement capacity (element 3). Various provisions of the Canadian Constitution
provide subnational constitutional primacy over forests, and the Canadian national
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government, like the U.S. government, has refused to attempt an extension of its
other constitutional powers over nonfederal forests. Subnational primacy over
forest policy, combined with the vast subnational ownership of forests, means that
the public/private ownership divide in Canada, as in the United States, places a
limit the national government’s options during international negotiations, as the
national government would be constrained in implementing international
obligations on a vast majority of forests within its borders.
The preceding review demonstrates that the public/private forest ownership
divide presented in Figure 1 only legally constrains the United States and Canada in
international negotiations on forests. Even then, the constraint is a result of the
other axis of analysis shown in Figure 1—that is, the constraint results from the
split in national and subnational constitutional authority over forests. Subnational
governments maintain constitutional primacy for regulating the majority of U.S.
forests, which are privately owned. Similarly, the Canadian Provinces, the regulator
with constitutional primacy over all subnationally owned forests in Canada,
actually own a majority of the nation’s forests. This indicates that the
national/subnational primacy divide over decentralized forest governance has the
greatest impact on international negotiations of the two axes (see Figure 1).
Recent research establishes a framework for analyzing the consequences of
federal systems lacking the above-described elements of forest policy formulation
and implementation, with both domestic and international implications.275 Indeed,
the global forest policy/decentralized forest governance elements, though useful
descriptors of federal forest-management governance structures, are more properly
categorized as subsidiary elements of a new, broader theory of policy design and
success.276 This framework facilitates a more focused study of the drivers of policy
failure and the areas of domestic governance upon which attention should be
concentrated to improve the policy-making process, including a focus not only on
political will, but also on the legal institutions that facilitate policy formulation,

275. See Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions: The Keystone of Nested Commons
Governance, 63 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
276. See generally PEARL ELIANDIS, MARGARET M. HILL & MICHAEL HOWLETT,
DESIGNING GOVERNMENT: FROM INSTRUMENTS TO GOVERNANCE (2005); MICHAEL HOWLETT,
DESIGNING PUBLIC POLICIES: PRINCIPLES AND INSTRUMENTS (2011); ALLAN MCCONNELL,
UNDERSTANDING POLICY SUCCESS: RETHINKING PUBLIC POLICY (2010); David Marsh &
Allan McConnell, Towards a Framework for Establishing Policy Success, 88 J. PUB. ADMIN.
564 (2010); Allan McConnell, Policy Success, Policy Failure and Grey Areas In-Between,
30 J. PUB. POL’Y 345 (2010). A recurring theme in policy design is that it is often unclear
what the aim of policy design should be. Though “design for success” seems like an obvious
goal, what are the preconditions of policy “success”? The theory put forth in this section, and
to be further developed in future research, sets forth the parameters of successful policy
design preconditions. Such a theory furthers McDermott, Cashore, and Kanowski’s call for
“a new generation of systematic research into forest policy questions” which notes the
“value of a new direction for policy studies in general, and global forest policy development
in particular.” MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 6–7. Such research might “promote a
more common global approach to the fundamentals of sustainable forest practices” which
can “only help facilitate broader learning and knowledge generation within both practitioner
and scholarly communities that is a prerequisite to addressing the continuing loss and
degradation of the world’s forests.” Id. at 7.
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such as federal constitutions. Though a great amount of research has been
performed on the policy-making process, including the linear progression of agenda
setting, policy formation, decision making, implementation, and policy
evaluation,277 scant attention has been given to the overarching framework in which
this linear process operates. In other words, a requisite level of institutional and
political capacity must be maintained by systems of government before they can
engage in linear policy formation that begins with an idea for policy and ends with
its successful implementation and evaluation. The requisite level of institutional
and political capacity necessary for successful policy formulation and
implementation can be represented by a Venn matrix (Figure 3, below) containing
four intersecting components: (1) the government’s institutional capacity to
formulate policy, (2) the government’s political will to formulate policy, (3) the
government’s institutional capacity to enforce policy, and (4) the government’s
political will to enforce policy.
As the above review demonstrates, governmental systems can contain any
combination of these components, but the presence of all four components provides
the necessary framework for successful policy making. As seen in Figure 3, at the
intersection of institutional capacity to formulate and to enforce, we can say a
sufficient policy-making institution exists. At the intersection of political will to
formulate and to enforce, we can say that sufficient policy-making political will
exists. Similarly, a governmental system may have both institutional capacity and
political will to formulate policy, leading to successful policy formulation, or both
institutional capacity and political will to enforce, leading to successful policy
implementation. When all four are present, the government has achieved a
successful policy.278
So where does the study undertaken in this Article of federal constitutional
authority to formulate forest policy fall within this matrix? If we define the
“institution” for these purposes as constitutional authority at the national level to
formulate forest policy, then component 1 of Figure 3 is our focus. Indeed,
component 1 of the matrix subsumes element 1 of the global forest
governance/decentralized forest policy balance (national constitutional primacy).
Without the national government first maintaining the institution of constitutional
authority, institutional capacity to enforce, political will to formulate, and political
will to implement policy are irrelevant. 279

277. See MICHAEL HOWLETT, M. RAMESH & ANTHONY PERL, STUDYING PUBLIC POLICY:
POLICY CYCLES & POLICY SUBSYSTEMS (2009).
278. Of course, whether the policy that “succeeds” is qualitatively “good” or “bad” and
whether it fairly represents the will of the entire corpus of civil society rather than merely
interest groups or the politically elite is a separate question from whether the fundamental
ingredients exist for actual formulation and implementation of a particular policy. Questions
of civil society inputs are affected by broader democratic processes and design of
governmental structure.
279. At first blush one might consider the Policy Formulation and Implementation matrix
also to be a linear process. It may appear that components 3 and 4 cannot exist unless
components 1 and 2 first exist. In other words, how can a government enforce and
implement a policy that does not yet exist? The resolution of constitutional law questions,
however, is quite often nonlinear. Governments may maintain the political will to formulate
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Figure 3

Take an illustration from the United States, for instance. The United States
offers many examples whereby the Constitution provides federal regulatory
authority over some subject matter (component 1), Congress maintains the political
will to pass legislation pursuant to that authority (component 2), and the federal
government maintains the institutional capacity and political will to enforce that
legislation (components 3 and 4). The Clean Air Act (CAA) 280 provides one
example, passed pursuant to federal Commerce Clause authority over industrial
pollutants, and enacted as a result of the strong political will to regulate air
pollution during the 1970s. The federal government has further successfully
utilized a variety of administrative institutions, such as the Environmental

policy (component 2), believing they have sufficient institutional (constitutional) capacity to
formulate it (component 1). They may even set up institutions to administer and enforce the
policy (components 3 and 4). Even so, sometime later the legislation may be challenged in
the courts as unconstitutional. If it is found to be so, then the “retroactive” absence of
component 1 renders policy making unsuccessful. Examples are the statutes at issue in the
Lopez (United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)) and Morrison cases (United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)) where the Court struck down as unconstitutional statutes
already passed by Congress and already put into implementation.
280. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2006).
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Protection Agency and state agencies, to enforce the CAA and improve national air
quality.281
Domestic forest policies, on the other hand, provide a case study of how federal
systems can maintain different combinations of policy formulation/implementation
components, leading to divergent outcomes regarding a national government’s
ability to formulate policy as a resource management fail-safe in the event that
subnational governments do not adequately manage the resource. As demonstrated
above, the Brazilian, Indian, and Russian Constitutions all maintain explicit
constitutional provisions related to forest protection, with Brazil in particular
maintaining some of the most stringent national-level forest protection mandates in
any federal constitution.282 Thus, each of these systems maintains component 1
(institutional capacity to formulate forest management policy). In addition, each of
these federal systems maintains component 2 because each has politically
capitalized on its institutional capacity by formulating national forest policy
legislation.
Even so, each nation is missing crucial components of policy implementation
and enforcement (components 3 and 4, which effectively subsume element 3 in the
global forest governance/decentralized forest policy balance). These national
governments are unable to enforce legislation passed pursuant to their broad
constitutional powers over forests because each is plagued by some
implementation/enforcement malady, such as a weak judiciary, lack of financial
resources, lack of enforcement culture, corruption, unclear division of powers
between different levels of government, and unclear separation of powers between
branches of government. National policies will not be successful without these
crucial components of policy implementation and enforcement.
The U.S. and Canadian federal systems, on the other hand, present quite the
opposite scenario regarding national-level forest policy making, as each maintain
sufficient enforcement and implementation capabilities (components 3 and 4), but
neither maintains institutional capacity to formulate policy (component 1)—a
scenario arising directly out of their chosen forms of constitutional federalism. In
the future, the U.S. and Canadian national governments may very well gain the
political will to formulate a national forest policy applicable to privately, state, and
provincially owned forests (component 2), and may also maintain both the
institutional capacity (component 3) and political will (component 4) to enforce
such a policy. Yet, the presence of those three components is irrelevant if the
constitution does not grant the national government legal authority to formulate
policy in the first instance (component 1). Thus, the policy will either never be
formulated, or even if it is formulated—and regardless of whether it actually
succeeds on the ground—it may be challenged and later held unconstitutional by
the courts.
It is lack of institutional capacity to formulate policy—arising out of
constitutional structure—that affects not only the ability of federal systems like

281. Of course, the degree of the success can be debated, as some areas of the country
remain in nonattainment with the CAA. Even so, there is no doubt that air quality has
improved under the CAA.
282. See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 23, 24, 225 (Braz.).
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those of the United States and Canada to formulate national domestic forest
policies, but also prevents their participation in the full range of global forest
governance approaches to addressing climate change. It is important to situate the
U.S.
and
Canadian
constitutional
orders
within
this
policy
formulation/implementation matrix so that scholars can undertake a clearer and
more focused study of the drivers of law and policy failure, and how those drivers
may be adjusted to achieve success—which is the goal of the companion piece of
scholarship to this Article, titled Fail-safe Federalism and Climate Change: The
Case of U.S. and Canadian Forest Policy.283
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, we see that in the context of international forest negotiations, the
concept that “[f]ederalism and a spirited foreign policy go ill together” 284 need not
apply, in a legal sense, to countries with all three key elements, like Australia.
Countries with the Australian model of constitutional structure maintain the ability,
via national constitutional primacy, to enter into an international agreement on
forests without concern over potential subnational legal interference. They also
have adequate institutional enforcement capacity to ensure implementation, and
they voluntarily share forest authority with subnational governments to preserve the
benefits of decentralized forest management. This is true within a legal sense
because whether such countries politically choose to allow federalism to bode ill
for their foreign policy is a separate question from whether the legal institution that
facilitates political will (the constitution) allows conformation to foreign policy
objectives.
Similarly, Brazil, India, and Russia maintain the institutional framework for
both national constitutional primacy and national sharing of constitutional
authority, but they do not have institutional enforcement capacity. Lack of this
element hampers their ability to implement an international agreement and thus
may give rise to apathy at the negotiating table and political interference with legal
objectives. It also prevents the benefits of decentralized forest governance from
being realized.
Without national constitutional primacy over all forests, the United States and
Canada will have difficulties engaging fully in global climate change governance
and entering into certain types of binding treaties that include forest management,
especially ones that mandate particular forms of prescriptive or minimum standard
setting regulation. Furthermore, without the sharing of constitutional authority that
can flow from national constitutional primacy, the U.S. and Canadian national
governments may not effectively balance the benefits of centralized forest
management planning with decentralized management domestically.
Scholars have adequately assessed, and are currently exploring, the implications
of weak constitutional structure, apathetic judiciaries, corruption, and other
institutional problems in countries like Brazil, India, and Russia—governance
characteristics that lead to a lack of institutional enforcement capacity on forest

283. Hudson, supra note 103.
284. WHEARE, supra note 2, at 196.
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policy (element 3). Scholars, however, have failed to assess how the domestic
constitutional orders of countries like the United States and Canada might be
adjusted to leave all of the legal and policy response tools on the table for global
climate and forest governance. The companion article in this line of research285
undertakes that endeavor and explores both the implications of, and solutions to,
the absence of elements 1 and 2 in the United States and Canada. The article
explores how the U.S. and Canadian federal constitutional frameworks can be
strengthened in order to forge “Fail-safe Federalism”286 that facilitates more
successful negotiation of an international agreement on global forest management
and climate change.
The mechanisms for achieving this adjustment can take many forms.287 Some
mechanisms arise directly out of national or subnational initiative and utilize
existing constitutional processes, falling within the categories of top-down,
horizontal, and bilateral. A top-down approach would allow the national
government to gain inputs into subnational forest policy by directly utilizing
current constitutional mechanisms, such as constitutional amendment or expanded
interpretation of other national government constitutional powers. A bilateral
approach would require the national government to provide incentives or
disincentives—legislative or otherwise—to subnational governments, encouraging
them to voluntarily adopt national standards on forest management related to
climate change mitigation. A horizontal approach would involve subnational
governments agreeing with other subnational governments to take collective action
to address forest management in the context of climate-change mitigation—even in
the absence of a top-down mandate (though this approach may still be induced by
bilateral incentives). Though a horizontal approach would not result from direct
national inputs into subnational forest management standards, it may render the
fail-safe role of the national government unnecessary and also create a de facto
national constitutional primacy that gives the national government more flexibility
during international negotiations related to forests. In other words, the states would
voluntarily bind themselves to a position that does not restrain the national
government in international negotiations on climate and forests, but that rather
reinforces the goals of the global governance regime. And, of course, all three of
these approaches may overlap to varying degrees.
Sometimes, however, the internal circumstances within a federal system are not
readily conducive to top-down, bilateral, or horizontal mechanisms of adjusting
constitutional structure. Other means of achieving those adjustments may arise
from external pressures that civil society places on individual governments to take
action. These “pathways of transnational impacts” 288 on domestic governance can
result in shifts in constitutional structure related to forest management if civil
society is able to successfully sustain pressure along each pathway, or along key
combinations of pathways.289

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Hudson, supra note 103.
Id.
See id. at Part IV.
See id. at Part IV.B.
Id.
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In the end, one of the approaches outlined above is warranted to adjust
constitutional structure in the United States and Canada, as well as perhaps other
federal systems not here reviewed—if, that is, these systems place value on
international treaty making and global governance to address climate change via
utilization of the world’s forest. Most federal constitutions provide a “treaty power”
in one form or another. As a result, these countries already—at least on paper—
value global governance to a certain degree, having provided a constitutional tool
authorizing the national government to participate in international agreements.
Given that federal systems controlling important forest resources maintain
constitutional structures that allow subnational governments to constrain
international climate change negotiations, the need for creative constitutional
methods facilitating effective global environmental governance has never been
more apparent. Though regulation of land use activities like private forest
management may have historically been the “quintessential” state and local
government role, climate change is now the “quintessential” global challenge.
Forging national level fail-safes within the constitutional orders of forested federal
systems will allow the ultimate source of legal authority in these countries, the
constitution, to recognize that which science already does—that local forests have
impacts beyond subnational and national political boundaries; impacts felt on the
other side of the globe.

